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INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court of the United States rarely grants certiorari in 
a veterans benefits case.  Congress gave the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit exclusive jurisdiction over veterans 
appeals in 19881 but, until 2009, the Supreme Court had reviewed 
only two Federal Circuit veterans decisions.2  In the 2010 Term, 
however, the Court decided its second veterans case in less than two 
years.3  Although patent lawyers are familiar with a trend of 
increasing Supreme Court interest in the Federal Circuit’s work,4 
little attention has been paid to the similar, albeit incipient, trend 
that may be emerging in the field of veterans law. 
In this Article, I explore whether the recent increase in Supreme 
Court veterans cases indicates a new, genuine interest in veterans law 
or is simply an aberration.  Although I conclude that it is too early to 
tell whether a clear trend is developing, the factors that have 
potentially contributed to the Court granting certiorari in two cases 
in three Terms have the potential to fuel a larger veterans docket for 
                                                 
 1. Veterans’ Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, § 301, 102 Stat. 4105, 
4120–21 (1988). 
 2. Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401 (2004); Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115 
(1994); see Michael P. Allen, The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims at 
Twenty:  A Proposal for a Legislative Commission to Consider Its Future, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 
361, 372 n.59 (2009). 
 3. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197 (2011); Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S. Ct. 
1696 (2009). 
 4. See, e.g., Gregory A. Castanias, Lawrence D. Rosenberg, Michael S. Fried & 
Todd R. Geremia, Survey of the Federal Circuit’s Patent Law Decisions in 2006:  A New 
Chapter in the Ongoing Dialogue with the Supreme Court, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 793, 796 
(2007); see also infra note 72 (citing additional commentary). 
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the Supreme Court in the future.  Most notably, veterans in recent 
years have increasingly been represented by attorneys with substantial 
experience in both the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, 
thanks to newly created pro bono programs for veterans who have 
meritorious claims but no legal counsel.5 
In addition to exploring the Supreme Court’s encounters with 
veterans law, this Article, as is customary in this issue of the American 
University Law Review, summarizes significant developments in 
veterans benefits law in 2010, focusing mainly on the decisions of the 
Federal Circuit.6  I also briefly consider important veterans legislation 
passed by Congress and administrative regulations issued by the 
United States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA).7 
The Article proceeds as follows:  Part I provides background on the 
veterans claims process and the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction over 
veterans cases.  Part II explores the emerging dialogue between the 
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit on issues of veterans law and 
concludes that we might be entering a new phase of increased 
Supreme Court supervision of Federal Circuit veterans decisions.  In 
Part III, I summarize and analyze the important veterans cases 
decided by the Federal Circuit in 2010.  Part IV reviews legislative and 
administrative developments in the field of veterans law.  I conclude 
by considering what the future may hold for veterans before the 
Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit, Congress, and the VA. 
I. THE VETERANS CLAIMS PROCESS AND  
FEDERAL CIRCUIT JURISDICTION 
As of September 30, 2010, 3.2 million veterans received disability 
compensation from the VA.8  To obtain disability benefits, an eligible 
veteran9 must prove three basic elements:  (1) a present disability, (2) 
                                                 
 5. See infra Part II.C. 
 6. See infra Part III. 
 7. See infra Part IV. 
 8. Nat’l Ctr. for Veterans Analysis & Stat., Department of Veterans Affairs Statistics at 
a Glance, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS (Dec. 2010), available at 
http://www.va.gov/vetdata/docs/Quickfacts/Homepage-quickfacts.pdf.  Veterans 
are eligible for a wide range of benefits from the VA, from education benefits to life 
insurance benefits to burial and memorial benefits.  See generally U.S. DEP’T OF 
VETERANS AFFAIRS, FEDERAL BENEFITS FOR VETERANS, DEPENDENTS & SURVIVORS (2010), 
available at http://www1.va.gov/opa/publications/benefits_book.asp (summarizing 
benefits available from the VA to veterans, dependents, and survivors).  Because 
Federal Circuit case law mainly focuses on medical disability benefits, I focus on that 
area of law in this background discussion. 
 9. For an overview of which service members are eligible for benefits and which 
are not, see Miguel F. Eaton, Sumon Dantiki & Paul R. Gugliuzza, Ten Federal Circuit 
Cases from 2009 that Veterans Benefits Attorneys Should Know, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1155, 
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incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury while in military 
service, and (3) a causal connection between the present disability 
and the in-service disease or injury.10  A veteran may submit a formal 
claim for benefits online11 or by submitting a hard-copy form12 and 
supporting evidence to a VA regional office (RO).13  The RO reviews 
the claim under the “benefit of the doubt” standard.14  Under this 
standard, the VA must grant a veteran’s claim if the evidence in favor 
of and against the claim is approximately equal.15 
As the benefit of the doubt standard suggests, the claims process is 
not intended to be adversarial.16  The VA has a statutory duty to make 
reasonable efforts to assist a veteran in developing the evidentiary 
record to support the claim.17  As part of the duty to assist, the VA 
must, among other things, obtain relevant medical records for the 
veteran,18 provide medical examinations to certain veterans,19 and 
notify veterans of the evidence necessary to substantiate their claims.20 
                                                 
1157–58 (2010); see also VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL ch.2 (Barton F. Stichman & 
Ronald B. Abrams, eds., 2010) (summarizing eligibility criteria for VA benefits). 
 10. Holton v. Shinseki, 557 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also 38 U.S.C. 
§ 1110 (2006) (providing benefits “[f]or disability resulting from personal injury 
suffered or disease contracted in line of duty, or for aggravation of a preexisting 
injury suffered or disease contracted in line of duty” during a period of war); id.  
§ 1131 (providing benefits for the same disabilities as § 1110 for times other than a 
period of war). 
 11. Veterans Online Application (“VONAPP”), U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 
http://vabenefits.vba.va.gov/vonapp/main.asp (last visited Feb. 28, 2011). 
 12. VA Form 21-526, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS (2009), available at 
http://www.vba.va.gov/pubs/forms/VBA-21-526-ARE.pdf. 
 13. There are fifty-nine VA regional offices, located both in the United States and 
abroad.  Contact Veterans Benefits Administration, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS (Sept. 
18, 2008), http://www.vba.va.gov/bln/21/ro/rocontacts.htm.  For a simple overview 
of the claims and appeals process, see HOW DO I APPEAL?, BD. OF VETERANS APPEALS 
(Apr. 2002) available at http://www.bva.va.gov/docs/Pamphlets/010202A.pdf 
[hereinafter HOW DO I APPEAL?].  In addition to formal claims for benefits, certain 
actions by a veteran or the VA are considered to be informal claims.  See infra Part 
III.D.2 (addressing the relationship between informal and formal claims for the same 
benefits). 
 14. 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b). 
 15. See id. (“When there is an approximate balance of positive and negative 
evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter, the Secretary 
shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant.”); see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (2010) 
(further explaining the VA’s policy that “reasonable doubt” be resolved in favor of 
the veteran). 
 16. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(a) (“Proceedings before VA are ex parte in nature, and 
it is the obligation of VA to assist a claimant in developing the facts pertinent to the 
claim and to render a decision which grants every benefit that can be supported in 
law while protecting the interests of the Government.”). 
 17. 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(a)(1) (enacted as part of the Veterans Claims Assistance 
Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-475, § 2, 114 Stat. 2096, 2097). 
 18. Id. § 5103A(b). 
 19. Id. § 5103A(d). 
 20. Id. § 5103(a)(1). 
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The VA regional office makes the initial decision about whether a 
veteran is entitled to benefits.  If the RO determines that a veteran 
has a service-connected disability, it then makes two further 
determinations.  First, it determines the severity of the disability by 
assigning a “rating,” a percentage that accounts for the impairment of 
earning capacity of an average veteran suffering from the same 
disability.21  The VA will give a 100% disability rating, for example, to 
a veteran suffering from a disability that would render the average 
veteran completely incapable of holding gainful employment.22  The 
rating determines the amount of monthly benefits paid to the 
veteran.23 
In addition to awarding benefits based on generalizations about 
the effect of particular disabilities on the average veteran, the system 
also accounts for the unique circumstances of individual claimants, 
particularly those who cannot maintain employment.  For example, a 
veteran without a 100% disability rating may still be considered totally 
disabled if the VA grants “total disability based on individual 
unemployability,” called “TDIU” in the parlance of veteran’s law.24  
To obtain a TDIU rating, the veteran must meet two criteria.  First, 
the veteran must be unable to sustain gainful employment because of 
a disability connected to military service.25  Second, the veteran must 
have one disability rated at or above 60% or the veteran must have a 
combined disability rating26 of 70% or more with one of the 
disabilities rated at 40% or more.27 
The second determination made by the VA is the “effective date” 
for benefits payments, typically a date in the past.  By regulation, the 
effective date is usually the later of:  (a) the date the VA received the 
claim for benefits or (b) the date the veteran became entitled to 
benefits (i.e., the date the disability arose).28  Thus, upon receiving an 
                                                 
 21. Id. § 1155. 
 22. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.15 (2010) (explaining the total disability rating). 
 23. See 38 U.S.C. § 1114 (providing the rates of monthly compensation for each 
disability rating).  A veteran’s monthly disability payment can range from $0 (for a 
disability rated at 0% impairment of earning capacity) to $2673 (for a disability rated 
at 100%).  Id. § 1114(a)–(j).  Veterans who suffer from particularly severe disabilities 
are entitled to special compensation beyond the normal disability payment.  See id.  
§ 1114(k)–(s). 
 24. VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL, supra note 9, at 329–30. 
 25. Id. at 329. 
 26. In the case of a veteran who suffers from multiple disabilities, the VA rates 
each disability separately.  Amberman v. Shinseki, 570 F.3d 1377, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 
2009).  The VA then uses a “combined ratings table” to calculate a single disability 
rating used to determine the veteran’s monthly payments.  See 38 C.F.R. § 4.25. 
 27. 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(a). 
 28. Id. § 3.400. 
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award, a veteran will, in addition to receiving benefits in the future, 
usually receive back payments of benefits to compensate for the time 
it took the VA to decide the claim.29 
If the regional office determines that a veteran is not eligible for 
benefits, or if the veteran disagrees with the rating or effective date 
established by the RO, the veteran may file a notice of disagreement, 
which initiates an appeal to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board).30  
Once a veteran files a notice of disagreement, the RO must prepare a 
statement of the case, which, in essence, forms the record on 
appeal.31  The RO sends the statement of the case to the veteran, 
along with VA Form 9, the substantive appeal form.32  To perfect the 
appeal to the Board, the veteran must return that form to the RO 
within sixty days of the date the RO mailed the statement of the case, 
or within one year of the original RO decision denying the claim, 
whichever is later.33 
Before further discussing the claims process, it is important to note 
that, until the veteran files a notice of disagreement and appeals to 
the Board, the veteran is prohibited from retaining paid counsel to 
pursue a claim.34  This limitation has, correctly in my view, been 
criticized.35  Although the VA has a statutory duty to assist the veteran 
and must resolve all doubts in the veteran’s favor, the claims process 
                                                 
 29. VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL, supra note 9, at 591; see, e.g., Carpenter v. 
Principi, 15 Vet. App. 64, 68 (2001) (awarding over $206,000 in past-due benefits). 
 30. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(f).  The notice of disagreement must be filed within one 
year from the date that the RO notifies the veteran of its decision.  Id. § 20.302(a).  
As an alternative to filing a notice of disagreement, a veteran may first request that 
the file be reviewed by a Decision Review Officer at the RO who, in essence, performs 
a second review of the veteran’s file.  HOW DO I APPEAL?, supra note 13, at 4. 
 31. 38 U.S.C. § 7105(d)(1) (2006); see 38 C.F.R. § 19.29 (providing that a 
statement of the case must contain (1) a summary of evidence in the case,  
(2) a summary of the applicable law, and (3) the reasons for the RO’s ruling). 
 32. HOW DO I APPEAL?, supra note 13, at 6. 
 33. See 38 C.F.R. § 20.302(b)(1).  See generally 38 U.S.C. § 7105(a) (2006) 
(outlining the procedure for appeal to the Board).  
 34. 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(1). 
 35. See, e.g., David R. DiMatteo, Comment, Walters Revisited:  Of Fairness, Due 
Process, and the Future of Veterans’ Fight for the Right to Hire an Attorney, 80 TUL. L. REV. 
975, 976–82 (2006) (collecting criticism of the ban on paid counsel); see also 
Benjamin W. Wright, The Potential Repercussions of Denying Disabled Veterans the Freedom 
to Hire an Attorney, 19 FED. CIR. B.J. 433, 446–57 (2010) (analyzing the statistical 
probability that veterans represented by counsel would succeed more often in their 
appeals); Matthew J. Dowd, Note, No Claim Adjudication Without Representation:  A 
Criticism of 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c), 16 FED. CIR. B.J. 53, 71–78 (2006) (arguing that the 
inability to have counsel prior to filing an appeal results in more pro se appeals, 
which often fail for procedural reasons); John W. Egan, Note, The Department of 
Veterans Affairs and the Constitutional Implications of Judicial Review:  Veterans’ Due Process 
Right to Hire Counsel, 16 FED. CIR. B.J. 31, 38–52 (2006) (contending that the 
prohibition on hiring an attorney violates veterans’ due process rights). 
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is inherently adversarial.36  The government has a scarce resource—
benefits funding—that it must allocate among veterans who want it.  
The VA’s institutional flaws, which are no different than those 
suffered by any bureaucratic government agency, compound the 
hostility between veterans and the VA.37  Furthermore, veterans who 
seek benefits are frequently persons who could most benefit from 
expert lawyer help to navigate the system.  Disability claims raise 
complex medical issues38 and the veteran’s ability to understand those 
issues might be obstructed by the very disability for which the veteran 
is applying for benefits. 
Of course, veterans may obtain free help in pursuing their claims 
from veterans service organizations and law students.39  But data on 
the success of veterans appearing before the Board (where veterans 
are, for the first time in the process, permitted to retain paid 
counsel) suggest that veterans with attorneys fare quite well.  In 2009, 
the Board allowed 24% of all the claims it decided, remanded 37.3%, 
                                                 
 36. See Battling the Backlog:  Challenges Facing the VA Claims Adjudication and Appeal 
Process:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 109th Cong. 31 (2005) 
(statement of Hon. Kenneth B. Kramer, Former C.J., U.S. Court of Appeals for 
Veterans Claims) (noting that “[s]ome will oppose [permitting a veteran to retain 
paid counsel earlier in the claims process] as upsetting the non-adversarial agency 
process, which in my mind is illusory once you have said ‘no’ to a claimant”); Tom 
Daschle, Making the Veterans Administration Work for Veterans, 11 J. LEGIS. 1, 11 (1984) 
(“[T]he appeals process is already adversarial.  Unfortunately for the veteran, the 
opposition acts as both defendant and judge.”); Robert L. Rabin, Preclusion of Judicial 
Review in the Processing of Claims for Veterans’ Benefits:  A Preliminary Analysis, 27 STAN. L. 
REV. 905, 919 (1975) (“While the VA appears to be a strongly client-oriented 
organization, . . . the VA is confronted with an impressive number of demands that it 
regards as unwarranted.”).  Congress took a step toward recognizing the de facto 
adversarial nature of the claims process when it amended § 5904 in 2006 to permit 
representation by paid counsel before the Board.  See Allen, supra note 2, at 378–79 
(citing Veterans Benefits, Health Care, and Information Technology Act of 2006, 
Pub. L. No. 109-461, § 101, 120 Stat. 3403, 3407).  Previously, veterans could retain 
counsel only after the Board issued a final decision.  See 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c) (2000). 
 37. See Richard E. Levy, Of Two Minds:  Charitable and Social Insurance Models in the 
Veterans Benefits System, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 303, 303 (2004) (explaining the 
problems of the veterans benefits administration process as resulting from the 
mixture of the “charity” and the “social insurance” benefits models); James T. 
O’Reilly, Burying Caesar:  Replacement of the Veterans Appeals Process Is Needed to Provide 
Fairness to Claimants, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 223, 227 (2001) (“The VA ‘paperwork system’ 
. . . has many significant flaws that deny the ex-soldier or ex-sailor accuracy, efficiency 
and acceptability:  three tenents [sic] noted . . . to be the keystones of good 
administrative procedure.”) (emphasis omitted); Melinda F. Podgor, Note, The 
Inability of World War II Atomic Veterans to Obtain Disability Benefits:  Time Is Running Out 
on Our Chance to Fix the System, 13 ELDER L.J. 519, 529–33 (2005) (asserting that the 
inefficient VA claims process has resulted in World War II atomic veterans being left 
without disability benefits). 
 38. Rabin, supra note 36, at 915. 
 39. Steven K. Berenson, Legal Services for Struggling Veterans—Then and Now,  
31 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 101, 134–39 (2009). 
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and denied 36.1%.40  Veterans with attorneys obtained allowance in 
22.7% of the cases, remand in 46.4%, and had the claim denied in 
28.8%.41  By comparison, unrepresented veterans fared much worse, 
having their claims allowed in only 18.7% of cases, remanded in 
32.9%, and denied in 46.1%.42  If veterans were permitted to retain 
counsel even earlier in the process—before a claim reaches the 
Board—veterans might have more success before the RO and, as an 
additional benefit, reduce the workload of the already overworked 
Board. 
Returning to the appeals process, the Board of Veterans Appeals 
consists of a chairman, vice chairman, principal deputy vice 
chairman, and sixty veterans law judges who decide nearly 50,000 
appeals annually.43  Appeals are decided by individual members of the 
Board, or by panels of three or more members.44  As with proceedings 
before the RO, an appeal to the Board is not intended to be 
adversarial, although, as noted, a veteran may retain paid counsel 
when appealing to the Board.45  At the veteran’s request, the Board 
conducts an in-person (or videoconference) hearing where the 
Board receives testimony and argument relevant to the appeal.46  The 
Board then issues a decision in writing that must:  state findings of 
fact and conclusions of law; explain the bases for those findings and 
conclusions; and contain an order allowing, denying, or remanding 
the claim to the RO or dismissing the appeal.47 
If the Board denies a claim, the veteran then has four options for 
continuing to pursue the claim.  First, the veteran may ask the Board 
                                                 
 40. BD. OF VETERANS APPEALS, FISCAL YEAR 2009 REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN 21–22 
(2009), available at  
http://www.bva.va.gov/docs/Chairmans_Annual_Rpts/BVA2009AR.pdf. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 3; see also 38 U.S.C. § 7101 (2006) (outlining the composition of the 
Board). 
 44. 38 C.F.R. § 19.3(a) (2010).  If the Board decides to reconsider its initial 
decision, the appeal will be considered by a panel of three (in the case of a matter 
originally heard by a single member) or by an enlarged panel (in the case of a matter 
originally heard by a panel of members).  Id. § 19.11(b); see also id. § 20.1000 (listing 
the grounds for reconsideration by the Board). 
 45. 38 C.F.R. § 20.700(c) (“Hearings conducted by the Board are ex parte in 
nature and nonadversarial.”). 
 46. Id. § 20.700(b), (e).  The hearing may take place at either the VA 
headquarters in Washington, D.C. or at any other VA office capable of hosting 
hearings.  Id. § 20.705. 
 47. 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d); 38 C.F.R. § 19.7(b); see also 38 C.F.R. § 19.9(a) 
(providing that the Board must remand a case to the RO “[i]f further evidence, 
clarification of the evidence, correction of a procedural defect, or any other action is 
essential for a proper appellate decision”). 
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to reconsider its decision.48  Second, the veteran may return to the 
RO and seek to reopen the claim.  To have a claim reopened, the 
veteran must present “new and material” evidence supporting the 
claim.49  Third, the veteran may ask either the RO or the Board to 
review its prior decision because it contained “clear and unmistakable 
error.”50  Unlike a request to reopen, which is based on new evidence, 
a claim of clear and unmistakable error “must be based on the record 
and the law that existed at the time of the prior adjudication.”51  
Finally, the veteran may file an appeal with the United States Court of 
Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans Court).52 
The Veterans Court is an Article I court with exclusive jurisdiction 
to review decisions of the Board.53  Only a veteran may appeal to the 
Veterans Court—the VA has no right to appeal.54  The scope of issues 
that the Veterans Court may decide is very broad and similar to the 
scope of issues that an Article III circuit court of appeals may 
consider when reviewing a decision of a district court or an 
administrative agency.  For example, the Veterans Court may  
(1) decide any relevant questions of law that arise in a benefits 
proceeding, (2) compel VA action unlawfully withheld or 
unreasonably delayed, (3) hold unlawful or set aside actions or 
regulations adopted by the VA, and (4) reverse the VA’s fact-finding 
if it is clearly erroneous.55  Also, just like the Article III courts of 
appeals, the Veterans Court must apply the harmless-error rule,56 
                                                 
 48. See supra note 44 (discussing the Board’s reconsideration procedure). 
 49. 38 U.S.C. § 5108; Norton v. Principi, 376 F.3d 1336, 1338–39 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  
There is no time limit on a veteran’s request to reopen a claim.  WILLIAM F. FOX, JR., 
THE LAW OF VETERANS BENEFITS:  JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 24 (2002). 
 50. 38 U.S.C. § 7111 (revision by the Board); § 5109A (revision by the RO). 
 51. Willsey v. Peake, 535 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  But, like a request to 
reopen, a veteran may request revision of a Board decision on the grounds of clear 
and unmistakable error at any time.  See 38 U.S.C. § 7111(d). 
 52. See 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a). 
 53. Id. § 7252(a).  The Veterans Court consists of at least three and not more 
than seven judges who are appointed for fifteen-year terms by the President and 
confirmed by the Senate.  Id. § 7253(a)–(c).  Currently, the court has seven judges.  
Judges, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, 
 http://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/about/judges/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2011).  The court 
may decide cases en banc, in panels of three, or, as the court resolves most of its 
cases, in a decision by a single judge.  38 U.S.C. § 7254(b); see FOX, supra note 49, at 
21–22 (noting that over seventy-five percent of cases are decided by a single judge). 
 54. 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a). 
 55. Id. § 7261(a); see also id. § 7261(c) (prohibiting the Veterans Court from 
retrying de novo any factual findings made by the VA or the Board); cf. 5 U.S.C.  
§ 706(1)–(2) (2006) (provision of the Administrative Procedure Act permitting the 
courts of appeals to compel agency action unlawfully withheld or to set aside 
unlawful agency action); FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (“Findings of fact, whether based on 
oral or other evidence, must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous . . . .”). 
 56. 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(2). 
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which forbids the Veterans Court from reversing a Board decision if 
the error did not affect a veteran’s “substantial rights.”57 
A decision of the Veterans Court may be appealed by the veteran—
or the government—to the Federal Circuit.58  In contrast to the 
Veterans Court’s broad jurisdiction, the scope of Federal Circuit 
review is narrow.  The Federal Circuit may review the Veterans 
Court’s rulings on questions of law (including issues of constitutional, 
statutory, or regulatory interpretation).59  But it may not review 
factual determinations, and it may review the application of law to 
fact only if it implicates a constitutional issue.60 
A Federal Circuit decision in a veterans case, like any decision by 
an Article III court of appeals, is reviewable in the Supreme Court of 
the United States by writ of certiorari.61  In the past two years, the 
Supreme Court has used its certiorari jurisdiction more frequently to 
review veterans cases, a development explored in the next Part. 
II. SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF VETERANS BENEFITS DECISIONS 
The previous Part outlined the long course that a veteran’s benefits 
claim might follow, winding its way through an administrative agency 
(the VA), an administrative appeal (before the Board), and judicial 
review by an Article I court (the Veterans Court) and Article III 
courts (the Federal Circuit and, possibly, the Supreme Court).  But 
this was not always the process.  Until 1988, there was almost no 
judicial review of veterans benefits determinations.62  Congress 
negated the usual presumption in favor of judicial review of 
administrative action63 with a statute making the VA’s benefits 
decisions “final and conclusive” and not subject to review by any court 
or official.64  Despite the statutory bar on judicial review of benefits 
decisions, the Supreme Court permitted court challenges to the 
                                                 
 57. Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S. Ct. 1696, 1705 (2009) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2111, 
which codifies the harmless error rule for the Article III courts of appeals) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 58. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a). 
 59. Id. § 7292(d)(1). 
 60. Id. § 7292(d)(2); Bastien v. Shinseki, 599 F.3d 1301, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 61. 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). 
 62. FOX, supra note 49, at 6–7; Lawrence B. Hagel & Michael P. Horan, Five Years 
Under the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act:  The VA Is Brought Kicking and Screaming Into the 
World of Meaningful Due Process, 46 ME. L. REV. 43, 43–44 (1994); History, U.S. CT. OF 
APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, http://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/about/History.cfm (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2011). 
 63. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967). 
 64. 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1988). 
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constitutionality of VA actions and veterans benefits laws.65  Yet the 
vast majority of the VA’s work, determining individual claims for 
benefits, remained almost entirely immune from judicial review.66 
In 1988, however, Congress passed the Veterans’ Judicial Review 
Act (“VJRA” or “the Act”), which created a system of judicial review of 
veterans benefits claims.67  The legislation was spurred by general 
perceptions that VA adjudications lacked consistency and were of 
poor quality.68  The Act created the Veterans Court to review 
decisions of the Board, and provided that legal issues decided by the 
Veterans Court could be appealed further to the Federal Circuit.69 
Because decisions of the Federal Circuit are reviewable on 
certiorari,70 the Act made it possible to appeal (on non-constitutional 
grounds) a veterans benefits decision all the way to the Supreme 
Court.  Yet, before 2009, the Supreme Court had decided only two 
veterans cases in the first twenty years of this new framework of 
judicial review.71  It is surprising, then, that the Court has decided two 
additional veterans cases in the past three Terms. 
This pattern may seem familiar to those who follow Federal Circuit 
patent law.  It has been well documented that the Supreme Court, 
after largely ignoring patent decisions for the first twenty years of the 
                                                 
 65. See Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 307 (1985) 
(reviewing the constitutionality of a statute that limited to $10 the fee charged by an 
attorney in a veterans benefits proceeding); Cleland v. Nat’l Coll. of Bus., 435 U.S. 
213, 213 (1978) (per curiam) (entertaining a constitutional challenge to a statute 
restricting the courses for which veterans educational benefits were available under 
the GI Bill); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366–74 (1974) (holding that § 211(a) 
did not preclude judicial review of a constitutional challenge to the VA’s denial of 
benefits to a conscientious objector); Hernandez v. Veterans’ Admin., 415 U.S. 391, 
393 (1974) (same); see also Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 543–44 (1988) 
(permitting judicial review of a claim that the VA wrongly denied a veteran an 
extension of time within which to use his educational benefits under the GI Bill 
because execution of the GI Bill was “not the exclusive domain” of the VA). 
 66. FOX, supra note 49, at 11. 
 67. Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105 (1988). 
 68. See FOX, supra note 49, at 14; Allen, supra note 2, at 376–77; Hagel & Horan, 
supra note 62, at 46; James D. Ridgway, The Veterans’ Judicial Review Act Twenty Years 
Later:  Confronting the New Complexities of the Veterans Benefits System, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 251, 253, 255–56 (2010).  For years, major veterans groups had actually 
blocked efforts at introducing judicial review.  By 1988, however, the insurgent 
Vietnam Veterans of America had broken with established veterans groups and 
“ma[d]e judicial review politically unstoppable” by publicizing the popularity of 
judicial review among veterans.  Laurence R. Helfer, The Politics of Judicial Structure:  
Creating the United States Court of Veterans Appeals, 25 CONN. L. REV. 155, 161–65 (1992). 
 69. VJRA § 301, 102 Stat. at 4113.  The Act also repealed a $10 statutory limit on 
attorneys’ fees, although veterans were still restricted from obtaining paid 
representation before the RO and the Board.  Id. § 104, 102 Stat. at 4108; see supra 
note 36 (discussing the statutory prohibition on paid counsel). 
 70. 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2006). 
 71. See infra Part II.A. 
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Federal Circuit’s existence, has become exceptionally active in patent 
law in the past decade.72  The recent uptick in Supreme Court 
veterans cases raises the question of whether we are similarly leaving a 
laissez faire “first wave” and entering a period of more aggressive 
Supreme Court oversight. 
A. The First Wave?  (1988–2008) 
The two veterans cases decided by the Supreme Court in the first 
two decades after the enactment of VJRA addressed the same topic:  
government monetary liability.  While all veterans benefits cases are 
essentially claims against the government for money, what 
distinguished these cases was that the claims were for compensation 
beyond what is provided in the typical benefits case. 
The first post-VJRA veterans case decided by the Court, the 1994 
decision in Brown v. Gardner,73 involved a veteran who sought 
compensation for a lower body injury that, the veteran alleged, was 
the unintended result of surgery in a VA hospital for a herniated 
disc.74  The question presented was whether, to recover damages for 
an injury resulting from VA medical treatment, a veteran must prove 
that the VA was “at fault,” i.e., that it acted negligently or carelessly.75  
The relevant statute provided compensation for “an injury or an 
aggravation of an injury” that occurred “as the result of” VA medical 
treatment.76  The Court held that the statute did not require the 
veteran to show fault by the VA.77  The Court insisted that the word 
                                                 
 72. See, e.g., Castanias et al., supra note 4, at 798–816; Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, 
Lecture, What the Federal Circuit Can Learn from the Supreme Court—and Vice Versa,  
59 AM. U. L. REV. 787, 792–93 (2010); John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return 
of the Supreme Court to the Bar of Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 278 (2002); Timothy 
B. Dyk, Foreword, Does the Supreme Court Still Matter?, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 763, 764–65 
(2008); Arthur J. Gajarsa & Lawrence P. Cogswell, III, Foreword, The Federal Circuit 
and the Supreme Court, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 821, 821–23 (2006); John M. Golden, The 
Supreme Court as “Prime Percolator”:  A Prescription for Appellate Review of Questions in 
Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 658–59 (2009); Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, 
Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1625, 1639–40 
(2007).  An article in the 2007 Federal Circuit issue of this Journal identified “three 
waves” of Supreme Court review of Federal Circuit patent cases.  Castanias et al., 
supra note 4.  In the first wave (1982–94), the Supreme Court took a “hands off” 
approach to patent law.  Id. at 798.  In a second wave (1995–2002), the Court 
decided important questions of patent law, but generally affirmed the Federal 
Circuit.  Id. at 802–03.  Finally, in the current third wave (2002–present), the Court 
has actively disagreed with the Federal Circuit on questions of patent law, as well as 
on questions of jurisdiction and procedure in patent cases.  Id. at 808–10. 
 73. 513 U.S. 115 (1994). 
 74. Id. at 116. 
 75. Id. at 116–17. 
 76. Id. at 116 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 1151 (Supp. 1988)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 77. Id. at 117. 
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“injury” did not connote a fault standard and that the “as a result of” 
language required only a causal connection between the injury and 
VA treatment.78 
Ten years later, the Court decided its second post-VJRA veterans 
case.  In Scarborough v. Principi,79 the veteran prevailed in the Veterans 
Court, so his attorney applied for fees under the Equal Access to 
Justice Act (EAJA).80  Although the attorney timely filed the fee 
application, the application did not allege, as required by EAJA, that 
the government’s litigating position “was not substantially justified.”81  
By the time the attorney realized the mistake, the deadline for filing 
the application had passed.82  The question was whether the attorney 
could, after the filing deadline, amend the fee application.83 
The Court permitted the post-deadline amendment.84  It reasoned 
that the no-substantial-justification requirement was simply a 
pleading requirement, which was subject to the relation-back 
doctrine.85  That doctrine permits a litigant to cure a defect in the 
form of a pleading after the filing deadline has passed because the 
formally imperfect filing leaves no doubt about the substantive issues to 
be contested.86 
Gardner and Scarborough were strong candidates for certiorari.  Both 
cases presented questions about the interpretation of statutes 
imposing financial liability on the federal government.87  Moreover, 
in Gardner, the Solicitor General urged the Court to grant certiorari, 
                                                 
 78. Id. at 117–20.  Congress has since amended the relevant statue to require a 
showing of fault.  See 38 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (2006) (requiring claimant to show that 
injury or death resulted from “carelessness, negligence, lack of proper skill, error in 
judgment, or similar instance of fault on the part of the [VA]”); see also infra Part 
III.E (discussing 2010 Federal Circuit case applying Gardner to acts of omission). 
 79. 541 U.S. 401 (2004). 
 80. Id. at 408. 
 81. Id. at 409 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 82. Id. at 409–10. 
 83. Id. at 406. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 415–16. 
 86. Id. at 415–19; see FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(B) (providing that “[a]n 
amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when . . . 
the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, 
or occurrence set out . . . in the original pleading”). 
 87. See ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 248 (8th ed. 2002) 
(noting that, in cases involving the government, the Court may grant certiorari 
“where the issues simply concern the construction of a major federal statute” and 
that “[t]he fact that especially large amounts of money are involved in litigation over 
the issue of statutory construction may also be a persuasive factor”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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which greatly increased the odds of Supreme Court review.88  
Although the government opposed review in Scarborough,89 that case 
was particularly suitable for certiorari given that the courts of appeals 
had disagreed on whether an EAJA fee application could be 
amended after the initial filing deadline had run.90  In short, both 
Gardner, which essentially involved a question of federal government 
tort liability, and Scarborough, which presented a clear circuit split on a 
federal statute of general application, involved issues that the 
Supreme Court would likely have decided regardless of whether they 
arose in a veterans case or in some other field. 
B. A New Wave?  (2009–present) 
In the past two years, the Supreme Court has, for the first time, 
considered issues in veterans cases that do not directly implicate the 
federal government’s financial liability.  Instead, both cases decided 
since 2009 address issues of procedure that, to some extent, apply 
only to veterans cases. 
In its 2009 decision in Shinseki v. Sanders,91 the Court overturned an 
unusual framework that the Federal Circuit had developed to 
determine which errors in veterans cases were prejudicial and thus 
warranted reversal on appeal.92  At issue in Sanders was the statutory 
duty of the VA to assist veterans in developing claims.  Upon 
receiving an application for benefits, the VA must notify the veteran 
of any additional evidence that the VA needs to substantiate the 
claim.93  The statute also requires the VA to tell the veteran what 
evidence the veteran must provide and what evidence the VA will 
attempt to obtain.94  In addition, the statute creating the Veterans 
                                                 
 88. Brief for the Petitioner at ii, Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115 (1994) (No.  
93-1128), 1994 WL 233282; see also STERN ET AL., supra note 87, at 221 (noting that 
“[t]he rate of success for petitions for certiorari filed by the Solicitor General on 
behalf of the United States is consistently far greater than the overall rate”). 
 89. See Brief for the Respondent in Opposition at 7, Scarborough v. Principi,  
541 U.S. 401 (2004) (No. 02-1657), 2003 WL 22428008. 
 90. See Scarborough, 541 U.S. at 410; see also STERN ET AL., supra note 87, at 226 
(“One of the prime purposes of the certiorari jurisdiction is to bring about 
uniformity of decisions . . . among the federal courts of appeals.”).  Although Gardner 
and Scarborough were the Court’s only cases arising out of the VJRA judicial review 
procedure, the Court also encountered veterans law in Mansell v. Mansell, a case in 
which the Court reviewed a decision of a California state court and held that certain 
military retirement pay was not community property divisible upon divorce.  490 U.S. 
581, 594–95 (1989).   
 91. 129 S. Ct. 1696 (2009). 
 92. Id. at 1700. 
 93. Id. at 1700–01 (citing 38 U.S.C. § 5103A (2006); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159 (2008));  
see also supra text accompanying notes 17–20 (discussing the duty to assist). 
 94. Sanders, 129 S. Ct. at 1700–01 (citing 38 U.S.C. § 5103; 38 C.F.R. § 3.159). 
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Court instructs the court to “take due account of the rule of 
prejudicial error.”95  In Sanders, the Court reviewed two Federal 
Circuit decisions that had held certain VA notice errors to be 
prejudicial, warranting reversal of the agency’s decision.96  In so 
holding, the Federal Circuit had adopted a presumption that any 
notice error is prejudicial and requires reversal unless the VA can 
show that the error did not affect the “essential fairness” of the 
proceeding.97 
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Federal Circuit’s 
framework, noting that it was too rigid, too complex, and imposed 
unreasonable burdens on the VA.98  The Court emphasized that a 
“harmless error” framework, whether applied by an Article III court 
of appeals or by the Veterans Court, must be a “case-specific 
application of judgment, based upon examination of the record.”99 
Unlike Gardner and Scarborough, which resolved medical 
malpractice and attorneys’ fees issues that arise only in an unusual 
veterans case, Sanders has major significance for ordinary veterans 
claims, given that over 4000 claims annually are appealed to the 
Veterans Court.100  Thus, although it is not beyond dispute, one could 
argue that the harmless-error question resolved in Sanders 
represented a deeper foray into veterans law than the Court’s prior 
decisions. 
Shortly before this Article went to press, the Court decided its 
second veterans case in less than two years.  At issue in Henderson v. 
Shinseki was whether the 120-day statutory deadline for filing a notice 
of appeal to the Veterans Court is a “jurisdictional” deadline, which 
may not be waived by the parties or equitably tolled, or a mere 
“claims-processing rule,” which may be waived or tolled.101  The en 
banc Federal Circuit had held, in a 9–3 decision, that the deadline 
                                                 
 95. See id. at 1701 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(2)). 
 96. Id. at 1702–03. 
 97. Id. at 1702. 
 98. Id. at 1700. 
 99. Id. at 1705. 
 100. See Annual Reports, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, available at 
http://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/documents/Annual_Report_FY_2009_October_1_200
8_to_September_30_2009.pdf [hereinafter VETERANS COURT ANNUAL REPORTS] 
(noting that, for fiscal year 2009, 4725 new cases were filed in the Veterans Court). 
 101. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1200 (2011); see also 38 U.S.C. 
7266(a) (2006) (“In order to obtain review by the Court of Appeals for Veterans 
Claims of a final decision of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, a person adversely 
affected by such decision shall file a notice of appeal with the Court within 120 days 
after the date on which notice of the decision is mailed . . . .”). 
1216 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1201 
 
for appealing a Board decision is a jurisdictional requirement.102   
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Alito, unanimously 
reversed.103  
The Court noted that, although the 120-day deadline for appealing 
to the Veterans Court is established by statute, not all statutory 
deadlines for appeal are jurisdictional.104  In the Court’s view, the 
“unique administrative scheme” for reviewing veterans benefits 
determinations required a contextual inquiry into whether Congress 
intended the deadline at issue to be jurisdictional.105  The Court 
emphasized the pro-veteran, informal, and non-adversarial nature of 
the veterans benefits system in determining that Congress did not 
intend the appeal deadline to have jurisdictional consequences.106 
The resolution of the procedural question in Henderson, like the 
holding in Sanders overturning the Federal Circuit’s harmless-error 
framework, is directly relevant to veterans cases only.  Henderson did 
not, for example, resolve a circuit split over a generally applicable 
question of procedural law.  Henderson did, however, implicate a 
larger debate over which deadlines in federal law are jurisdictional 
(and hence not subject to waiver or tolling) and which are not.107  
The Court’s opinion in Henderson will likely provide guidance to 
future courts addressing similar questions in other areas of law.  Yet, 
like the opinion in Sanders, it will not directly impact legal analysis in 
fields besides veterans law. 
C. A New Dialogue Between the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit 
It is too early to conclude whether the Supreme Court has 
developed a genuine interest in veterans law, or whether the recent 
increase in veterans cases is simply an anomaly.  But whether the 
                                                 
 102. Henderson v. Shinseki, 589 F.3d 1201, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc) 
(citing Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007)). 
 103. Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1206.  Justice Kagan was recused.  Id. at 1207. 
 104. Id. at 1203. 
 105. Id. at 1204. 
 106. Id. at 1205–06. 
 107. See, e.g., Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1241 (2010) 
(holding non-jurisdictional a requirement of the Copyright Act that a plaintiff 
register the work before suing for infringement); John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. 
United States, 552 U.S. 130, 132–34 (2008) (holding jurisdictional a time limit on 
suits filed against the federal government in the Court of Federal Claims); Bowles v. 
Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007) (holding that the time limit for filing a notice of 
appeal in a civil case is jurisdictional); see also Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 
504 (2006) (holding non-jurisdictional a requirement of Title VII that an employer-
defendant have fifteen or more employees); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 447 
(2004) (holding non-jurisdictional a deadline contained in the Federal Rules of 
Bankruptcy Procedure for objecting to a debtor’s discharge). 
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increase is a trend or an aberration, it is worthwhile to consider what 
might be causing the Court’s veterans docket to grow.  This inquiry is 
interesting not only as an academic matter.  It could also provide 
insight into which future cases might be strong candidates for 
Supreme Court review.  I do not intend this to be an exhaustive 
discussion of the factors driving the Court’s growing veterans docket.  
Rather, I offer these preliminary observations simply to lay a 
foundation for future discourse and to complement emerging 
scholarship on factors shaping the Supreme Court’s current docket.108 
This emerging scholarship has focused on expert Supreme Court 
advocates as a powerful force in shaping the Court’s docket, so the 
most plausible explanation for the Court’s burgeoning veterans 
docket might similarly involve the lawyers litigating the cases.  The 
Court accepted review in Sanders based on the Solicitor General’s 
petition for certiorari.109  In Henderson, the Court granted certiorari 
based on a petition filed by attorneys from the appellate and 
Supreme Court practice group at the law firm of Arnold & Porter.110  
These experienced Supreme Court litigators stood a much better 
chance of securing review than the average veterans attorney,111 or, as 
occurs frequently, the veteran proceeding pro se.112 
                                                 
 108. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Docket Capture at the High Court, 119 YALE L.J. 
ONLINE 89, 89–90 & n.3 (2009), available at 
 http://yalelawjournal.org/2010/01/24/lazarus.html (suggesting that the Court’s 
docket may be “captured” by “powerful economic interests” represented by an 
“expert Supreme Court bar” “that know[s] best how to influence the decisionmaking 
of the Justices at the jurisdictional stage”); Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before 
and Within the Supreme Court:  Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. 
L.J. 1487, 1490–91 (2008) [hereinafter Lazarus, Advocacy Matters] (similar); see also 
Adam Liptak, Justices Offer Receptive Ear to Business Interests, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/19/us/19roberts.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all 
(“The Roberts court’s engagement with business issues has risen along with the 
emergence of a breed of lawyers specializing in Supreme Court advocacy, many of 
them veterans of the United States solicitor general’s office, which represents the 
federal government in the court.  These specialists have been extraordinarily 
successful, both in persuading the court to hear business cases and to rule in favor of 
their clients.”). 
 109. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 7–9, Peake v. Sanders, 129 S. Ct. 1696 
(2008) (No. 07-1209), 2008 WL 782560. 
 110. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 2, Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 
1197 (2011) (No. 09-1036), 2010 WL 688025.  Counsel of record on the petition was 
a former Assistant to the Solicitor General.  See Lisa S. Blatt, ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, 
http://www.arnoldporter.com/professionals.cfm?u=BlattLisaS&action=view&id=540
9&bio_practice_id=893 (last visited Feb. 28, 2011). 
 111. See Lazarus, Advocacy Matters, supra note 108, at 1493–94, 1498–99 (examining 
how attorneys from the Office of the Solicitor General, armed with expertise and the 
trust of the Court, created profitable Supreme Court practice groups in private law 
firms). 
 112. See VETERANS COURT ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 100, at 1 (noting that, for 
fiscal year 2009, sixty-eight percent of veterans were self-represented upon filing the 
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As the Henderson case suggests, veterans with non-frivolous claims 
receive better representation today than ever before.  In April 2007, 
the Federal Circuit Bar Association created a pro bono program 
matching seasoned Federal Circuit litigators with veterans who have 
meritorious appeals but no legal counsel.113  In addition, other 
veterans organizations have in recent years recruited experienced 
appellate litigators to handle veterans cases.114  As a result of these 
efforts, scores of veterans have been represented in the Federal 
Circuit by firms with extensive experience in that court.115  With 
expert appellate litigators representing an increasing number of 
veterans in the Federal Circuit and on certiorari to the Supreme 
Court, veterans cases could begin to occupy the Court’s docket to a 
greater extent than in the past.116 
Fueling the pro bono interest in veterans law and, indirectly, the 
Court’s veterans docket, might be recent, disturbing examples of 
stress on the veterans benefits system and disarray in the benefits 
process.  The Washington Post’s high-profile exposé of the Walter Reed 
Medical Center called widespread attention to the squalid conditions 
and bureaucratic confusion encountered by many wounded soldiers 
upon return from battle.117  Since then, many journalists and 
                                                 
appeal, and twenty-eight percent remained unrepresented upon the closure of the 
case). 
 113. See Veterans Pro Bono Initiative, FEDERAL CIRCUIT BAR ASS’N, 1 (April 2007), 
available at  
http://memberconnections.com/olc/filelib/LVFC/cpages/11/Library/VETERANS
%20PRO%20BONO%20PROGRAM%20PDF.pdf (noting that the program was 
created because of the increased number of pro se veterans appeals in recent years, a 
number which may further increase in the future). 
 114. See Laura Parker, Lawyers Step Up to Help Veterans Gratis, U.S.A. TODAY, Nov. 26, 
2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-11-26-valawyers_N.htm 
(discussing the recruitment efforts of the National Veterans Legal Services Program). 
 115. See, e.g., Henderson v. Shinseki, 589 F.3d 1202, 1220 n.12 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en 
banc) (Arnold & Porter LLP), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 1197 (2011); Moore v. Shinseki, 555 
F.3d 1369, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Wiley Rein LLP); Phillips v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 
1358, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Sidley Austin LLP); Edwards v. Shinseki, 582 F.3d 1351, 
1352 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, L.L.P.); 
Cushman v. Shinseki, 576 F.3d 1290, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Morrison & Foerster 
LLP); Comer v. Peake, 552 F.3d 1362, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Weil, Gotshal & Manges 
LLP); Hogan v. Peake, 544 F.3d 1295, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Wilmer Cutler 
Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP). 
 116. I do not intend to denigrate the hard work of solo and small-firm 
practitioners who zealously represent the interests of their veteran clients.  My point 
is only that it is nearly beyond debate that a small number of lawyers—almost 
invariably associated with large, corporate law firms—have significant influence on 
the Supreme Court’s docket, see supra note 108, and that, to the extent those lawyers 
become more involved in veterans cases, the more likely it is that the Supreme 
Court’s veterans docket will grow. 
 117. Dana Priest & Anne Hull, Soldiers Face Neglect, Frustration at Army’s Top Medical 
Facility, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/02/17/AR2007021701172.html. 
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commentators have chronicled current and looming challenges for 
the VA in dealing with veterans returning from Iraq and Afghanistan, 
problems that are exacerbated by repeat deployments, waning public 
support for military action, and economic difficulties awaiting 
veterans at home.118  It is the appalling treatment endured by 
returning soldiers that has spurred many experienced litigators to 
lend support to the cause of disabled veterans.119 
There are, however, ready responses to the claim that better 
representation for veterans is driving the growth in veterans cases 
before the Supreme Court.  Importantly, although both Sanders and 
Henderson are superficially relevant to veterans cases only, both 
decisions fit into larger jurisprudential trends at the Court.  
Henderson, for example, can be seen as part of the Court’s effort to 
eliminate so-called drive-by jurisdictional rulings.120  Because the 
characterization of a rule as “jurisdictional” has drastic and 
potentially wasteful consequences (by requiring the dismissal of a 
case at an advanced stage of proceedings),121 the Court has taken 
great pains in recent years to distinguish jurisdictional rules from 
substantive-merits rules and claims-processing rules.122  Viewed in this 
light, Henderson, which held that the deadline for appealing to the 
Veterans Court is a mere claims-processing rule, is simply another 
chapter in this larger jurisprudential narrative. 
In addition, Sanders could arguably be viewed as one salvo in the 
Supreme Court’s on-going quest to ensure that the Federal Circuit 
applies the same procedural and remedial rules as other courts, 
notwithstanding the Federal Circuit’s unique subject-matter 
jurisdiction.123  For example, in recent years, the Supreme Court has 
overturned the Federal Circuit’s inflexible rule that an injunction 
should automatically follow a finding of patent infringement, 
                                                 
 118. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 2, at 363 (citing Washington Post and New York Times 
commentary); James Dao, Mental Health Problems Plague Returning Veterans, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 17, 2009, at A10 (noting the significant number of Iraq and Afghanistan veterans 
suffering from mental health problems); Erik Eckholm, For Veterans, a Weekend Pass 
from Homelessness, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2009, at A13 (addressing the increasing number 
of younger veterans from Iraq and Afghanistan who have ended up homeless);  
see also Veterans for Common Sense v. Peake, 563 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1055 (N.D. Cal. 
2008) (dismissing a suit challenging various aspects of veterans benefits system, 
noting that “[t]he remedies to the problems, deficiencies, delays and inadequacies 
complained of are not within the jurisdiction of this Court”). 
 119. Parker, supra note 114. 
 120. See Howard M. Wasserman, The Demise of “Drive-by Jurisdictional Rulings”,  
105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 184, 184–85 (2011). 
 121. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011). 
 122. Wasserman, supra note 120, at 184–85. 
 123. See Castanias et al., supra note 4, at 815. 
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emphasizing instead that the traditional multi-factor test for 
injunctive relief should apply.124  Similarly, the Supreme Court has 
ruled that, when reviewing fact-finding by the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office, the Federal Circuit should apply the substantial-
evidence standard of the Administrative Procedure Act—the same 
standard applied by regional circuits reviewing agency fact-finding.125  
Further examples of the Supreme Court’s disapproval of patent-
specific procedural and remedial rules abound.126  In the context of 
this case law, Sanders, which held that the Federal Circuit must apply 
to veterans appeals the same harmless-error standard applied in other 
fields of law, could be seen as just another example of the Supreme 
Court insisting that the Federal Circuit use the same procedural and 
remedial rules as other federal courts.127 
Working with such a small sample set, it is impossible to 
confidently predict whether the recent increase in Supreme Court 
veterans cases is a clear trend or simply an aberration.  What is clear, 
however, is that the foundation for a robust Supreme Court veterans 
docket is in place.  Improved representation for veterans pursuing 
appeals to the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court as well as an 
ever-increasing number of veterans seeking benefits128 should give rise 
to scores of challenging questions of veterans law in the years ahead. 
III. THE 2010 VETERANS BENEFITS DECISIONS  
OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
One trend, however, clearly cuts against projections of a larger 
number of Supreme Court veterans cases in the years to come.  In 
                                                 
 124. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391–92 (2006). 
 125. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 152 (1999) (overturning Federal Circuit 
holding that the clearly erroneous standard applies). 
 126. See, e.g., Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 
826, 832–34 (2002) (rejecting the argument that the phrase “arising under,” as 
relevant to the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction over cases “arising under” the patent 
laws, should be interpreted differently than the same phrase as relevant to general 
federal question jurisdiction); Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809, 
810–11 (1986) (per curiam) (emphasizing that the clearly erroneous standard of 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) applies to district-court factual determinations 
underlying patent law’s obviousness inquiry).   
 127. The Supreme Court’s rejection in Sanders of the Federal Circuit’s rigid 
presumption of prejudicial error might also be seen as part of the Supreme Court’s 
continuing displeasure with the Federal Circuit for favoring rigid, bright-line rules 
over flexible standards.  See Gregory A. Castanias, Douglas R. Cole, Jennifer L. Swize, 
Vaishali Udupa & Tiffany D. Lipscomb-Jackson, Survey of the Federal Circuit’s Patent 
Law Decisions in 2010:  The Advent of the Rader Court, 60 Am. U. L. Rev. 845, 855–
62(2011). 
 128. See infra note 501 and accompanying text (noting that the number of claims 
received annually by the VA has increased from 579,000 to 1,014,000 in 2009). 
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2010, the Federal Circuit decided only fourteen veterans cases by 
precedential opinion.129  From 2007 to 2009, by contrast, the court 
annually decided an average of twenty-five veterans cases by 
precedential opinion.130  Notwithstanding the smaller number of 
precedential decisions, the opinions, as usual, covered a wide range 
of veterans law issues.  Although it is difficult to trace a coherent 
theme through decisions on such varied topics, many of the decisions 
reflect a preference for a flexible, standards-based approach to 
deciding veterans claims.  The decisions tend to reject categorical 
rules, whether those rules were adopted by the Veterans Court (such 
as a rule automatically rejecting the opinions of physicians who do 
not review a veteran’s in-service medical record),131 or proposed by 
claimants (such as a rule that the VA must always provide a medical 
examination as part of the duty to assist).132 
This Part summarizes each one of this year’s precedential Federal 
Circuit veterans rulings.  As would be expected in a comprehensive 
survey, some of the opinions discussed are highly significant for 
future cases while others are fact-specific and less likely to have long-
term doctrinal relevance.  Thus, while I provide a summary of each 
case, I offer more extensive commentary on the decisions that may be 
important to veterans going forward. 
I discuss the cases in the order in which the issues they address 
would generally be encountered in a benefits proceeding, beginning 
with the VA’s statutory duty to assist a veteran in developing a benefits 
claim.  I then turn to the questions of whether a veteran’s disability is 
connected to military service and, if so, the date on which the 
benefits award should be effective.133  I conclude by discussing matters 
of procedure (such as the revision of erroneous claim decisions and 
the VA’s implicit denial of claims it mistakenly leaves pending) and 
compensation for injuries resulting from VA medical treatment. 
                                                 
 129. As might be expected given the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction to review only 
questions of law in veterans cases, the majority of Federal Circuit non-precedential 
dispositions were dismissals for lack of jurisdiction.  One can confirm this assertion 
by searching Westlaw’s Federal Circuit database (CTAF) for decisions on review from 
the Veterans Court. 
 130. See infra addendum fig.1 (illustrating the number of precedential veterans 
opinions issued by the Federal Circuit each year since 2000); see also infra addendum 
fig.2 (noting a similar decrease in the total number of veterans cases decided by the 
Federal Circuit). 
 131. Gardin v. Shinseki, 613 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 132. Waters v. Shinseki, 601 F.3d 1274, 1278–79 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 133. The Federal Circuit in 2010 issued no precedential opinions discussing VA 
ratings decisions, so this Part does not discuss that significant aspect of VA 
adjudication. 
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A. Duty to Assist 
The Federal Circuit decided three cases in 2010 clarifying the 
scope of the duty to assist.  One case addressed the VA’s duty to 
obtain relevant medical records and a pair of cases discussed the VA’s 
duty to provide medical examinations to help substantiate claims.  I 
discuss each issue in turn. 
1. Medical records 
The statutory duty to assist requires the VA to make “reasonable 
efforts” to help a veteran obtain the evidence needed to establish the 
claim for benefits.134  In making “reasonable efforts,” the VA is not 
required to obtain all of the veteran’s medical records.  Rather, the 
VA need only obtain records that are relevant to the claim.135  In Golz 
v. Shinseki,136 the Federal Circuit elaborated on which medical records 
are considered relevant, holding that the VA need only obtain 
records that relate to the injury for which the veteran is seeking 
benefits and that have a “reasonable possibility” of helping to 
substantiate the claim.137 
The veteran, Julius Golz, served in the Navy from 1969 to 1972.138  
In 1995, the Social Security Administration found that Golz was 
disabled due to back and leg pain caused by a car accident.139  The 
Social Security decision did not discuss any psychiatric or mental 
health issues.140  Golz then sought benefits from the VA for service-
connected post-traumatic stress disorder.141  The VA denied the claim 
and Golz appealed to the Board, asserting that the VA violated its 
duty to assist by not obtaining the medical records accompanying the 
Social Security decision.142  The Board affirmed the denial of benefits, 
noting that it reviewed a copy of the Social Security decision itself, 
which did not mention a psychiatric disorder, indicating that the 
accompanying medical records would not be relevant to Golz’s post-
traumatic stress disorder claim.143  The Veterans Court affirmed, as 
did the Federal Circuit.144 
                                                 
 134. 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(a)(1) (2006). 
 135. McGee v. Peake, 511 F.3d 1352, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 136. 590 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 137. Id. at 1321. 
 138. Id. at 1319. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 1319–20. 
 143. Id. at 1320. 
 144. Id. at 1320, 1323. 
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Writing for the court, Judge Moore began by making clear that the 
duty to assist requires the VA to obtain only medical records that are 
relevant to the claim at hand: 
There can be no doubt that Congress intended VA to assist 
veterans in obtaining records for compensation claims, but it is 
equally clear that Congress only obligated the VA to obtain 
“relevant” records.  The duty to assist requires the Secretary to 
make reasonable efforts to obtain “evidence necessary to 
substantiate the claimant’s claim for a benefit.”145 
The court then outlined what it considered to be relevant records:  
“Relevant records for the purpose of § 5103A are those records that 
[1] relate to the injury for which the claimant is seeking benefits and 
[2] have a reasonable possibility of helping to substantiate the 
veteran’s claim.”146 
The court noted that the Social Security decision, which primarily 
addressed claims of back pain, did not indicate that the proceeding 
examined Golz’s mental health.147  Because the Veterans Court 
applied the correct legal standard in assessing the relevance of the 
Social Security medical records (whether the records were related to 
Golz’s mental health or might help establish his claim), the Federal 
Circuit affirmed.148 
The opinion also contained important guidance for the VA and the 
Veterans Court in applying the “relevance” standard.  The court 
emphasized that a record’s relevance cannot always be determined 
without reviewing the record itself.149  The VA must “examine the 
information it has related to [the] medical records” and obtain the 
records if there is a “specific reason” to believe that the record 
contains pertinent information.150  “In close or uncertain cases,” the 
court cautioned, “the VA should be guided by the principles 
underlying this uniquely pro-claimant system.”151 
The standards-based approach of Golz makes plain that the VA has 
no rigid obligation to obtain medical records that, judging by the 
information the VA possesses, appear irrelevant.  But if the 
information suggests a reasonable possibility that the records could help 
                                                 
 145. Id. at 1321 (quoting 38 U.S.C. §§ 5103A(a)(1), (b)(1) (2006)). 
 146. Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1316 (8th ed. 2004)). 
 147. Id. at 1322. 
 148. Id. at 1322–23.  
 149. Id. at 1323. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. (emphasizing that the VA must “fully and sympathetically develop the 
veteran’s claim to its optimum before deciding it on the merits” (quoting McGee v. 
Peake, 511 F.3d 1352, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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establish the claim, the VA must retrieve the records.152  Given the 
court’s emphasis that the relevant inquiry should be resolved in the 
claimant’s favor in close cases, the VA should keep the bar for 
establishing relevance low. 
2. Medical examinations 
The statutory duty to assist also requires the VA to provide the 
veteran with a medical examination when necessary to make a 
decision on a claim for benefits.153  Obtaining a VA-provided medical 
examination is often crucial to establishing a claim for service-
connected benefits.  Without a VA-provided examination, the veteran 
must pay for the specialized opinion of a private physician.  
Moreover, the private physician will likely be unfamiliar with the 
veteran’s service medical record and the evidentiary standards unique 
to veterans claims.154  In 2010, the Federal Circuit decided a pair of 
cases that, taken together, show that it is difficult, but not impossible, 
for a veteran to obtain a VA medical examination based solely on the 
veteran’s own assertions of service connection, as opposed to medical 
evidence of service connection. 
a. Unsupported lay assertions of service connection 
In Waters v. Shinseki,155 the Federal Circuit held that the duty to 
assist does not require the VA to grant medical examinations 
“routinely and virtually automatically.”156  Rather, the VA must grant a 
medical examination only when the claimant satisfies a three-part test 
set forth in the statute.157 
George Waters was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia while 
serving on active military duty.158  After Waters left the service, he was 
diagnosed with hypertension, depression, and diabetes.159  Waters 
sought compensation from the VA for these newly diagnosed 
disabilities, claiming that antipsychotic drugs administered during 
service caused his hypertension and diabetes.160  The VA denied the 
claims, finding that there was no competent evidence of connection 
between Waters’s in-service schizophrenia and his current diagnoses 
                                                 
 152. Id. at 1322. 
 153. 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(d)(1) (2006). 
 154. See Duenas v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 512, 521 (2004) (Hagel, J., concurring). 
 155. 601 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 156. Id. at 1278–79. 
 157. Id. at 1276–77 (citing 38 U.S.C. § 5013A(d)(1)). 
 158. Id. at 1275. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
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of diabetes and hypertension.161  On appeal to the Veterans Court, 
Waters claimed that the VA did not satisfy its duty to assist because it 
had not provided a medical examination.162  The Veterans Court 
rejected the argument, noting that the only evidence that Waters’s 
current disability was connected to his military service was Waters’s 
own statements, and that his lay assertions did not trigger the VA’s 
duty to provide a medical examination.163 
The Federal Circuit affirmed in an opinion by Judge Friedman.164  
The court began by reiterating that the VA is required to provide a 
medical examination only when the examination is “necessary to 
make a decision on the claim.”165  The court pointed out that the 
statute provides a three-part test for determining when an 
examination is “necessary” to make a decision: 
The [VA] shall treat an examination or opinion as being necessary 
to make a decision on a claim . . . if the evidence of record before 
the [VA] . . . (A) contains competent evidence that the claimant 
has a current disability, or persistent or recurrent symptoms of 
disability; and (B) indicates that the disability or symptoms may be 
associated with the claimant’s active military, naval, or air service; 
but (C) does not contain sufficient medical evidence for the [VA] 
to make a decision on the claim.166 
The court emphasized that each subsection imposes its own 
evidentiary standard, requiring either “competent evidence,” 
“evidence . . . indicat[ing],” and “medical evidence,” respectively.167  
The court thus faulted the Board for finding that Waters presented 
no “competent” medical evidence of a nexus between his service and 
his disability, when the pertinent subsection, subsection B, requires 
only “evidence . . . indicat[ing]” service connection.168  But the 
Federal Circuit found this error to be harmless because the Veterans 
Court had found that the record contained no evidence of service 
connection, other than Waters’s own statement.169  The court rejected 
Waters’s argument that his lay assertion of service connection, 
                                                 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 1276. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 1275. 
 165. Id. at 1276 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(d)(1) (2006)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 166. Id. at 1276–77 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(d)(2)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 167. Id. at 1277. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 1277–78. 
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standing alone, entitled him to a medical examination.170  The court 
noted that if it were to accept this argument, it would render 
superfluous “the carefully drafted statutory standards governing the 
provision of medical examinations.”171 
Yet Waters’s argument finds support in the plain language of 
subsection B, which mandates a medical examination if there is 
“evidence . . . indicat[ing]” service connection.172  Given that 
subsection A explicitly modifies the word “evidence” with the 
adjective “competent,” the omission of any modifier in subsection B 
appears to require only some evidence, “competent” or not.173  The 
Federal Circuit’s interpretation, however, reflects concerns about 
upsetting Congress’s intent and about the consequences of a literal 
reading of subsection B.174  If one were to read subsection B as 
requiring only “some” evidence of service connection, any veteran 
who asserted service connection, even without any persuasive 
evidence, would likely be entitled to a medical examination.175  If 
Congress had intended for claimants to receive medical examinations 
practically on demand, it would not have drafted the statute to allow 
for medical examinations only when “necessary” to decide a claim.176  
Perhaps Congress, through a more carefully drafted definition of the 
term “necessary,” could have saved the court the trouble of 
interpreting around the statute’s plain language. 
b. Persuasive lay testimony of service connection 
Although the court in Waters held that a veteran may not receive a 
medical examination based on an unsupported assertion of service 
connection, the Federal Circuit, in its 2010 decision in Colantonio v. 
Shinseki,177 clarified that sufficiently persuasive lay testimony can, 
standing alone, entitle a veteran to a medical examination.178 
                                                 
 170. Id. at 1278. 
 171. Id. 
 172. 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(d)(2)(B) (2006). 
 173. Compare id. § 5103A(d)(2)(A) (requiring “competent evidence” of a “current 
disability”), with id. § 5103A(d)(2)(B) (requiring “evidence . . . indicat[ing]” possible 
service connection). 
 174. Waters, 601 F.3d at 1278. 
 175. See id. (“At oral argument Waters contended that his conclusory generalized 
statement that his service illness caused his present medical problems was enough to 
entitle him to a medical examination under the standard of subsection B.  Since all 
veterans could make such a statement, this theory would . . . require the [VA] to 
provide such examinations as a matter of course in virtually every veteran’s disability 
case.”). 
 176. 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(d)(1). 
 177. 606 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 178. Id. at 1382.  
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Quareno Colantonio served in the Army during World War II.179  In 
1999, he filed a claim with the VA, seeking compensation for a back 
injury connected to his military service.180  Because there was no 
record of Colantonio having suffered a back injury while in service, 
the VA denied the claim.181  The Board agreed that there was no 
service connection because the only evidence of an in-service back 
injury came from Colantonio’s own statements and, in the Board’s 
opinion, Colantonio lacked competence to provide medical opinion 
testimony.182  The Veterans Court agreed, noting that Colantonio’s lay 
testimony “cannot provide the requisite medical nexus” and that “[a] 
lay person is not competent to opine on matters requiring medical 
knowledge, such as etiology of a condition or nexus.”183  On appeal, 
the Federal Circuit determined that this ruling was inconsistent with 
Waters and remanded.184 
The court noted that the Veterans Court’s ruling could be 
interpreted to mean “that a veteran’s lay testimony can never be 
sufficient in itself to satisfy the nexus requirement in section 
5103A(d)(2)(B).”185  Such a ruling, the Federal Circuit noted, would 
conflict with Waters, which made clear that subsection B requires only 
evidence “indicat[ing] that the disability . . . may be associated with . . 
. military . . . service” and does not necessarily require “competent 
medical evidence” to establish a nexus between service and a later 
disability.186  The court concluded:  “We reiterate the interpretation of 
subparagraph B adopted in Waters:  that medically competent 
evidence is not required in every case to ‘indicate’ that the claimant’s 
disability ‘may be associated’ with the claimant’s service.”187 
It is often not possible to establish, through lay evidence, a nexus 
between a current disability and military service.  But the Federal 
Circuit’s 2010 decisions in Golz, Waters, and Colantonio reflect an effort 
to balance the interests of veterans, who might not be able to afford 
persuasive medical evidence, with a desire to protect the scarce 
medical resources of the VA.  In some cases, like Waters, the lay 
evidence may be too self-serving to warrant a VA medical exam.188  
                                                 
 179. Id. at 1379. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 1380. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 184. Id. at 1382. 
 185. Id. at 1381 (emphasis added). 
 186. Id. at 1381–82 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(d)(2)(B) (2006)). 
 187. Id. at 1382. 
 188. Waters v. Shinseki, 601 F.3d 1274, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
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But, as the court made clear in Colantonio, subparagraph B requires 
only a “minimal showing” of nexus that can sometimes be satisfied by 
persuasive lay testimony,189 such as detailed statements of family 
members, friends, and coworkers regarding the symptoms and history 
of the disability and the effect of the disability on the veteran.190 
B. Service Connection 
As this discussion of Waters and Colantonio suggests, the required 
nexus between the current disability and military service is typically 
established through medical evidence:  a statement by a physician 
expressly connecting the veteran’s disability to military service.191  For 
certain veterans suffering from certain diseases, however, Congress 
and the VA have adopted legal presumptions that the diseases are 
service connected, obviating the need for the veteran to present 
evidence of a nexus.192  For veterans whose claims are subject to these 
presumptions, the VA must show that a particular veteran’s disease is 
not service connected.193 
In summarizing the Federal Circuit’s 2010 decisions on principles 
of service connection, I first discuss cases addressing the medical 
evidence necessary to establish the required connection between a 
current disability and military service.  I then address cases examining 
the presumptions for establishing service connection.  Finally, I 
discuss a series of cases that discuss principles of service connection as 
applied to a range of different disabilities that are not presumed to 
be service connected. 
1. Medical evidence 
a. Private physicians 
While veterans often rely on reports by VA physicians to establish 
service connection, they may also submit evidence from private 
physicians.194  In Gardin v. Shinseki,195 the Federal Circuit held that the 
                                                 
 189. Colantonio, 606 F.3d at 1382. 
 190. See VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL, supra note 9, at 895–96. 
 191. Id. at 104. 
 192. Id. at 125; see, e.g., 38 U.S.C. §§ 1111–12, 1116, 1118 (2006) (setting forth 
various presumptions applicable to benefits proceedings). 
 193. See VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL, supra note 9, at 125. 
 194. See 38 U.S.C. § 5125 (“For purposes of establishing any claim for benefits . . . 
a report of a medical examination administered by a private physician that is 
provided by a claimant in support of a claim for benefits . . . may be accepted without 
a requirement for confirmation by an examination by a physician employed by the 
Veterans Health Administration if the report is sufficiently complete to be adequate 
for the purpose of adjudicating such claim.”). 
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VA may not automatically discount a private physician’s opinion 
merely because the physician did not review the veteran’s in-service 
medical record.196 
Wayne Gardin served in the Air Force from 1959 to 1963.197  While 
in service, he developed symptoms consistent with diabetes.198  He 
was, however, not diagnosed with the disease until 1971, after he had 
been discharged.199 
The VA denied his initial claim for benefits because his service 
records did not indicate treatment for diabetes.200  To establish a 
nexus between his service and diabetes, Gardin then submitted (1) 
lay testimony by his family and friends stating that he had diabetes 
around the time of discharge and (2) medical reports by three 
physicians summarizing Gardin’s history of diabetes.201  The Board 
found the lay testimony not credible because it conflicted with the 
medical evidence.202  The Board also found Gardin’s medical 
evidence not credible.203  The Board rejected the report of one 
particular physician because the report did not indicate that the 
doctor reviewed Gardin’s “actual service medical records.”204  The 
Veterans Court affirmed, but the Federal Circuit vacated that 
ruling.205 
The Federal Circuit noted that the statute expressly permits 
veterans to submit reports from private physicians206 and that the 
implementing regulation requires only that a physician issuing a 
report be “qualified through education, training, or experience.”207  
The Federal Circuit held that the Veterans Court erred by holding 
that a private physician must review service medical records before 
opining on service connection.208  The court also made clear, 
however, that a private physician’s failure to review a service medical 
file may make the expert’s opinion less credible.209 
                                                 
 195.  613 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 196. Id. at 1378–79. 
 197. Id. at 1375. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id.  
 200. Id. at 1376. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 1376–77. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at 1377, 1380. 
 206. Id. at 1378 (citing 38 U.S.C. § 5125 (2006)). 
 207. Id. (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(a)(1) (2009)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 208. Id. at 1378–79. 
 209. See id. (noting that “a review of the veteran’s service medical records may 
have significance to the process of formulating a medically valid and well-reasoned 
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b. Lay testimony 
In addition to using the testimony of physicians, a veteran may 
submit the testimony of lay witnesses to establish service connection.  
In its 2007 decision in Jandreau v. Nicholson,210 the Federal Circuit held 
that lay evidence can be sufficient to establish a medical diagnosis 
when:  “(1) a layperson is competent to identify the medical 
condition, (2) the layperson is reporting a contemporaneous medical 
diagnosis, or (3) lay testimony describing symptoms at the time 
supports a later diagnosis by a medical professional.”211 
In Gardin, the case discussed immediately above, the veteran also 
claimed that the Veterans Court had erroneously required 
contemporaneous medical evidence before considering lay evidence 
to be credible.212  The Veterans Court had affirmed the Board’s 
decision to discount the lay statements of Gardin’s family and friends 
because they were based on Gardin’s own statements, vague, and 
inconsistent with other evidence.213  On appeal, the Federal Circuit 
agreed with Gardin that, in light of Jandreau, the Board may not 
require contemporaneous medical evidence before considering lay 
evidence to be credible.214  The Federal Circuit determined, however, 
that the Board had not required contemporaneous medical 
evidence.215  Rather, the Board had found, as a matter of fact, that the 
statements were not credible.216  Whether the Board had correctly 
weighed the evidence was a question of fact beyond the Federal 
Circuit’s jurisdiction.217 
Similar to its duty-to-assist decisions in Golz, Waters, and Colantonio, 
the court in Gardin eschewed bright-line rules governing VA actions 
and decisions, instead encouraging the VA to engage in a holistic 
review of the available evidence before making a decision on any 
issue.  The contextual, standards-based approach of Gardin is also 
consistent with the statute governing the evidence that the VA must 
                                                 
opinion,” but that there is no “categorical rule excluding all private medical reports 
that [do] not include a review of the veteran’s service medical records”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (citing Nieves-Rodriguez v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 285, 304 
(2008)).   
 210. 492 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 211. Id. at 1377. 
 212. Gardin, 613 F.3d at 1379. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. at 1379–80. 
 216. Id. at 1380. 
 217. See id. (“The Board, as factfinder, had the obligation to determine whether 
Mr. Gardin’s lay evidence was credible; the Board concluded it was not. . . . Whether 
the Veterans Court was correct in affirming the Board’s credibility determination is a 
question of fact beyond this court’s jurisdiction.”). 
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consider in deciding benefits claims.  That statute requires the VA to 
adopt regulations “requiring that in each case where a veteran is 
seeking service-connection for any disability[,] due consideration 
shall be given to,” among other things, “all pertinent medical and lay 
evidence.”218  By rejecting categorical rules excluding certain types of 
evidence, the court in Gardin made clear that “all pertinent . . . 
evidence” really means all evidence.219  Evidence from a private 
physician may not be excluded simply because the physician did not 
review the veteran’s service medical record.220  Rather, the failure to 
review the service record may simply be considered by the VA in 
determining the persuasiveness of the physician’s report.221  Likewise, 
the VA may not require that contemporaneous medical evidence 
always support lay evidence.222  Instead, the VA must consider the lay 
evidence, but may discount the evidence if it is inconsistent with the 
medical record or is otherwise unpersuasive.223 
2. Presumed service connection 
The veterans statute lists a wide variety of diseases that are 
presumed to be service connected when suffered by certain veterans, 
such as former prisoners of war.224  For Vietnam veterans, Congress 
has taken a more complex approach.  In 38 U.S.C. § 1116, Congress 
listed certain diseases that are associated with herbicides used during 
the Vietnam War and are presumed to be service connected for 
Vietnam veterans.225  But Congress also ordered the VA, on an on-
going basis, to consider whether scientific evidence warrants 
expanding the list of diseases presumed to be service connected.226  In 
one important non-precedential Federal Circuit case decided in 
2010, the court ordered the VA to comply with its duty to issue 
regulations under this statute.227 
Congress enacted § 1116 as part of the Agent Orange Act of 
1991.228  Section 3 of that Act requires the VA to contract with the 
                                                 
 218. 38 U.S.C. § 1154(a) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 219. Gardin, 613 F.3d at 1379. 
 220. Id. at 1378. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. at 1379. 
 223. Id. at 1380. 
 224. See 38 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (2006). 
 225. Id. § 1116(a) (listing non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, certain forms of soft-tissue 
sarcoma, chloracne, Hodgkin’s disease, porphyria cutanea tarda, respiratory cancers, 
multiple myeloma, and type-2 diabetes as qualifying diseases). 
 226. Id. § 1116(b)–(c). 
 227. In re Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 392 F. App’x 858, 859, 861 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 228. See Pub. L. No. 102-4, § 2, 105 Stat. 11, 11–13 (1991). 
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National Academy of Sciences to study the relationship between 
exposure to herbicides used during the Vietnam War and certain 
diseases.229  Under the statute, when the Academy sends a report on 
certain diseases to the VA, the VA must consider whether a 
presumption of service connection is warranted for the diseases in 
the report.230  The statute requires the VA to issue proposed 
regulations setting forth its determination and, within ninety days of 
issuing the proposed regulations, to issue final regulations.231  On 
March 25, 2010, the VA issued proposed regulations adopting a 
presumption of service connection for B-cell leukemia, Parkinson’s 
disease, and certain types of heart disease.232  The ninety-day deadline 
for issuing the final rule passed without any action by the VA.233  
Groups of veterans filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the 
Federal Circuit, seeking an order compelling the VA to adopt a final 
rule.234 
The Federal Circuit granted the writ.  The court emphasized that 
the ninety-day deadline was not merely guidance, but a mandatory 
statutory requirement that the VA had no discretion to disregard.235  
Because the veterans’ right to VA action was clear, the court ordered 
the VA to issue a final regulation within thirty days of its August 2, 
2010 order.236  As discussed in Part IV.A below, the VA issued the final 
regulation on August 31, 2010. 
3. Post-traumatic stress disorder 
Another major regulatory development in veterans law this year 
was the VA’s amendment of the regulation defining the evidence 
required to establish service connection for a claim of post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD).237  As discussed below, the amendment 
eliminated a requirement that the veteran provide corroborating 
                                                 
 229. Id. § 3, 105 Stat. at 13. 
 230. 38 U.S.C. § 1116(c). 
 231. Id. § 1116(c)(2). 
 232. See In re Paralyzed Veterans, 392 F. App’x at 859. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id.  Mandamus is an extraordinary writ by which a court may, among other 
things, compel a government official to take an action that has been unlawfully 
withheld.  In the field of patent law, the Federal Circuit has recently made waves by 
aggressively using mandamus to compel the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of Texas to transfer infringement cases to more convenient fora.  See Paul R. 
Gugliuzza, The New Federal Circuit Mandamus 1–5 (Feb. 18, 2011) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at 
 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1734419. 
 235. In re Paralyzed Veterans, 392 F. App’x at 860. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Stressor Determinations for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 75 Fed. Reg. 
39,843 (July 13, 2010) (to be codified at 38 C.F.R. pt. 3). 
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evidence of an in-service stressor if the claimed stressor is related to 
the fear of hostile military or terrorist activity and is consistent with 
the veteran’s military service.238 
In Arzio v. Shinseki,239 the Federal Circuit made clear that, to 
establish service connection for PTSD, a veteran must satisfy the 
three-part test set forth in 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f), unless a more specific 
standard applies (such as the standard in the amended regulation).240  
Section 3.304(f) requires the veteran to provide medical evidence 
that the veteran has been diagnosed with PTSD, medical evidence 
supporting a link between the current PTSD symptoms and a stressor 
that occurred while in service, and credible evidence that the claimed 
stressor actually occurred.241 
Michael Arzio served in the Army and Navy from 1959 to 1962.242  
He did not participate in combat while in service.243  In 1990, Arzio 
sought compensation from the VA for PTSD.244  The VA noted that 
Arzio was indeed receiving treatment for PTSD, but found that Arzio 
had not provided evidence of the in-service stressors that he claimed 
occurred, as is required by § 3.304(f).245  On appeal, Arzio argued that 
he could establish service connection for PTSD without proving an 
in-service stressor.246  He claimed that a more general standard set 
forth in 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 provided an alternative means for 
establishing service connection for PTSD.247 
But § 3.303 is, as the court noted, “a broad regulatory provision 
addressing general service connection principles.”248  Rather than 
providing a substantive standard for establishing PTSD, § 3.303 
simply states that “[s]ervice connection connotes many factors but 
basically it means that the facts, shown by evidence, establish that a 
particular injury or disease resulting in disability was incurred 
coincident with service in the Armed Forces.”249  Section 3.304 itself 
makes clear that “[t]he basic considerations relating to service 
connection are stated in § 3.303,” and that § 3.304 contains specific 
“criteria” for evaluating claims of service connection for certain 
                                                 
 238. See infra Part IV.A. 
 239. 602 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 240. Id. at 1347. 
 241. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (2010). 
 242. Arzio, 602 F.3d at 1344. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. at 1345. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. at 1345–46. 
 248. Id. at 1346. 
 249. Id. (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (2010)). 
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disabilities, including PTSD.250  As the Federal Circuit noted, “when 
sections 3.303 and 3.304 are read together, it is evident that they do 
not provide alternative methods of establishing service connection, 
but instead work in tandem to delineate the circumstances under 
which a veteran can establish service connection for PTSD.”251  Under 
basic principles of regulatory construction, “the specific requirements 
of section 3.304(f) . . . take precedence over the general principles 
related to service connection set forth in section 3.303.”252 
Arzio thus establishes that specific regulatory provisions defining 
service connection trump the general standard of § 3.303.  This rule 
does not, however, always operate to the veteran’s detriment.  For 
example, the court in Arzio discussed Combee v. Brown,253 a case in 
which the Federal Circuit held that § 3.303 and § 3.311, which 
establishes a presumption of service connection for certain illnesses 
related to the testing or use of atomic weapons, provide alternative 
means of establishing service connection for those illnesses.254  Thus, 
under Combee and Arzio, any regulation that relaxes the requirements 
for establishing service connection for certain classes of veterans 
should be construed as an alternative means of establishing service 
connection for PTSD. 
4. Rare diseases 
In veterans cases, the Federal Circuit lacks jurisdiction to review 
fact-finding or the application of law to fact by the Veterans Court or 
the VA.255  This includes the determination of whether a veteran’s 
death or disability is connected to military service.256  In Bastien v. 
Shinseki,257 the court dismissed an appeal that challenged the VA’s 
determination that a rare form of cancer was not connected to in-
service radiation exposure.258  A dissenting opinion by Judge 
Newman, however, raised an important question about the legal 
standard for determining service connection in the case of rare 
diseases.259 
                                                 
 250. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(a) (emphasis added). 
 251. Arzio, 602 F.3d at 1347. 
 252. Id. 
 253. 34 F.3d 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 254. Arzio, 602 F.3d at 1348 (citing Combee, 34 F.3d at 1043–44). 
 255. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2) (2006). 
 256. Waltzer v. Nicholson, 447 F.3d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 257. 599 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 258. Id. at 1303, 1307. 
 259. See id. at 1308 (Newman, J., dissenting) (arguing that the correct legal 
standard for determining whether a rare disease was caused by military service “is not 
whether a preponderance of evidence establishes that causation was more likely than 
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During his military service, Robert Bastien worked on experiments 
that tested the effects of radiation on monkeys.260  Bastien placed the 
monkeys in a nuclear reactor where they were exposed to radiation 
and removed the monkeys after exposure.261  About twenty years after 
he left the service, Bastien died of pneumonia resulting from 
Waldenström’s macroglobulinemia, a rare blood cancer.262  Bastien 
also had been diagnosed with rare forms of lymphoma.263 
Bastien and, later, his widow, sought benefits for Mr. Bastien’s 
illness and death, which they asserted were caused by Mr. Bastien’s in-
service exposure to radiation.264  Mrs. Bastien and the VA presented 
conflicting evidence to the Board.265  Mrs. Bastien offered the 
testimony of two doctors.266  One testified that her husband’s cancer 
“could be related to radiation exposure,” and another testified that it 
was “plausible” that in-service radiation exposure caused Mr. Bastien’s 
illness and death.267  The VA, on the other hand, presented the 
testimony of two doctors who contended, respectively, that it was 
“unlikely” or “extremely unlikely” that Mr. Bastien’s radiation 
exposure caused his cancer.268  The Board determined that the 
testimony of the VA witnesses had greater probative value, and 
denied the claim.269  The Veterans Court affirmed.270 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to 
consider the cause of Mr. Bastien’s death.271  Writing for the court, 
Judge Friedman noted that Mrs. Bastien’s main argument was that 
the Board gave too much weight to the VA’s expert opinions and not 
enough weight to her experts’ evidence.272  This argument, Judge 
                                                 
not, but whether it is medically possible that the in-service activity caused the 
cancer”). 
 260. Id. at 1303 (majority opinion). 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. at 1303–04 (also describing the remainder of Mrs. Bastien’s evidence, 
which included her own calculations of the doses of radiation her husband received 
and a letter from a private nuclear engineering company). 
 268. Id. at 1304. 
 269. Id. 
 270. See id. at 1305 (observing that the Board is responsible for “review[ing] and 
assess[ing] the credibility and probative value of the evidence of record” and that the 
Board’s justifications for crediting the VA’s experts over the widow’s experts were 
“plausible and therefore not clearly erroneous”). 
 271. Id. at 1305–06. 
 272. Id.  
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Friedman noted, was an impermissible challenge to the evaluation 
and weighing of evidence.273 
Dissenting, Judge Newman identified a legal error that, in her view, 
corrupted the VA’s and the courts’ analyses.274  She noted that the 
Board’s decision and the majority’s ruling assumed that the proper 
standard for determining service connection was whether the 
radiation exposure was “more likely than not” to have caused Mr. 
Bastien’s rare cancer.275  But, Judge Newman noted, “the cause of 
Waldenstrom’s macroglobulinemia is not known,” and “all of the 
medical witnesses, whichever side retained them, stated that it was 
not possible to know whether Mr. Bastien’s . . . cancer was traceable” 
to his in-service radiation exposure.276 
Because it was impossible to determine what caused Mr. Bastien’s 
rare disease, Judge Newman proposed a different evidentiary 
standard for service connection in claims involving rare diseases.277  
Instead of a preponderance of the evidence standard, she proposed a 
standard that asked “whether it is medically possible that the in-
service activity caused the cancer.”278  This lower standard would 
apply, Judge Newman wrote, “when the disease is sufficiently rare that 
adequate data to prove or disprove causation do not exist.”279 
Judge Newman’s analysis is persuasive.  The lower standard she 
proposed accords with the pro-claimant ideal of the veterans benefits 
system.  More importantly, her “medical possibility” standard is 
consistent with Congress’s mandate that factual doubt in benefits 
proceedings be resolved in favor of the veteran.280  The VA’s own 
regulations provide that when the evidence “does not satisfactorily 
prove or disprove” the “service origin” of the claimed disability, the 
doubt should be resolved in the veteran’s favor.281  In the case of a 
disease whose cause is unknown, it seems as if the VA is resolving 
doubt against the veteran when it credits medical opinions stating 
                                                 
 273. Id. at 1306.  The Federal Circuit also rejected Mrs. Bastien’s argument that 
the Board erred by not requiring the VA to affirmatively establish the qualifications 
of its medical experts.  Id. 
 274. See id. at 1307–08 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 275. Id. at 1308. 
 276. Id. at 1307–08. 
 277. Id. at 1308. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id.; see also 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b) (2006) (“When there is an approximate 
balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the 
determination of a [claim for benefits], the [VA] shall give the benefit of the doubt 
to the claimant.”). 
 281. 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (2010). 
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that service connection is “unlikely” over medical opinions stating 
that service connection is “plausible.” 
5. Dental conditions 
Under 38 U.S.C. § 1712(a)(1)(C), veterans are entitled to 
outpatient services for dental conditions that are “due to combat 
wounds or other service trauma.”282  In Nielson v. Shinseki,283 the 
Federal Circuit held that “service trauma . . . does not include the 
intended result of proper medical treatment.”284 
Thomas Nielson served in the Air Force in the 1950s.285  During his 
service in the Korean War, he had most of his teeth extracted, 
apparently because of an infection.286  In 1991, Nielson sought new 
dentures from the VA under § 1712(a)(1)(C), claiming that he 
needed them because of “service trauma.”287  Relying on an opinion 
of the VA general counsel that “‘service trauma’ does not include the 
intended effects of treatment provided during the veteran’s military 
service,” the Board rejected Nielson’s claim.288  The Veterans Court 
and the Federal Circuit both affirmed.289 
Citing dictionary definitions of “trauma,” the Federal Circuit first 
concluded that the word referred to “an injury or wound to a living 
body caused by the application of external force or violence.”290  The 
court noted that the act of pulling teeth, an external physical force, 
could fit this definition.291  The court concluded, however, that 
Congress did not intend to include proper medical treatment in the 
definition of trauma.292 
The court first noted that if it were to construe “trauma” to include 
any injury suffered during service, it would render the word “service” 
superfluous, because the first portion of the statute already requires 
the injury to be connected to service.293  Moreover, the court 
emphasized that the general phrase “service trauma” should be 
                                                 
 282. 38 U.S.C. § 1712(a)(1)(C). 
 283. 607 F.3d 802 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 284. Id. at 804 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 285. Id.  
 286. Id. 
 287. Id.  
 288. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing General Counsel Precedent 
Opinion, Dental Care Eligibility—Nielson v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 22 (1994), 
VAOPGCPREC 5-97 (Jan. 22, 1997)). 
 289. Id. at 805, 809. 
 290. Id. at 806 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2432 
(unabr. ed. 1961)). 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. 
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interpreted to refer to the same kind of injuries as those that 
preceded the phrase in the statute.294  In the court’s view, Congress’s 
use of the preceding phrase “combat wounds” suggested that “service 
trauma” should likewise cover only injuries incurred while 
performing military duties.295 
C. Effective Date 
When the VA awards benefits, it also sets an effective date for the 
benefits payments.  The effective date chosen by the VA is a fruitful 
source of litigation because it determines the amount of back 
payments due to a veteran.296  In 2010, the Federal Circuit dealt with 
many issues related to effective dates, from the special rule granting 
an early effective date for claims filed within one year of the veteran’s 
discharge, to rulings increasing or decreasing benefits compensation. 
1. Claims filed within one year of discharge 
The setting of the effective date is left by statute to the VA’s 
judgment.297  Under the VA’s regulations, the effective date is 
normally the later of the date the veteran filed the claim or the date 
the claim arose.298  The only specific statutory requirement is that the 
effective date must be no earlier than the date on which the veteran 
applied for benefits.299  If, however, the veteran files for benefits 
within one year of the date of the veteran’s discharge, 38 U.S.C. 
§ 5110(b)(1) provides that the effective date is the day following the 
date of discharge.300 
In Butler v. Shinseki,301 the court rejected a veteran’s argument that, 
even though he filed his claim more than one year after discharge, 
the effective date should be the day after discharge under § 
5110(b)(1).302  In reaching this conclusion, the court, in an 
alternative holding that spurred another separate opinion from 
                                                 
 294. See id. at 807 (citing the interpretive canon of ejusdem generis). 
 295. Id. 
 296. See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text. 
 297. See 38 U.S.C. § 5110(a) (2006) (“Unless specifically provided otherwise in this 
chapter, the effective date of an award . . . shall be fixed in accordance with the facts 
found, but shall not be earlier than the date of receipt of application therefor.”). 
 298. 38 C.F.R. § 3.400 (2010). 
 299. 38 U.S.C. § 5110(a). 
 300. Id. § 5110(b)(1). 
 301. 603 F.3d 922 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam). 
 302. Id. at 926. 
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Judge Newman, ruled that the one-year period of § 5110(b)(1) is not 
subject to equitable tolling.303 
In 1992, Navy veteran Steven Butler filed a claim for a “foot 
condition,” specifically, a callus on his right foot.304  The VA granted 
service connection effective July 22, 1992, the date Butler filed his 
claim.305  Butler appealed to the Board, seeking to have the effective 
date changed under § 5110(b)(1) to the day after his discharge in 
November 1990.306  Butler claimed that he had attempted to file his 
claim within one year of his discharge, but had been told by VA 
personnel that he could not do so because his discharge was not 
honorable.307  Butler had thus waited to file his claim until he 
successfully challenged the nature of his discharge.308  In a 1998 
ruling, the Board denied Butler’s request for an earlier effective 
date.309 
Three years later, on February 26, 2001, Butler filed a claim for 
service connection for hallux valgus310 of both feet.  On December 23, 
2003, a VA physician diagnosed Butler with hallux valgus of both feet 
and observed callus formation on Butler’s left foot.311  Accordingly, 
the VA awarded service connection for hallux valgus, effective 
February 26, 2001 (the date Butler filed his claim) and for calluses of 
the left foot, effective December 23, 2003 (the date of the VA 
examination).312 
Butler appealed to the Board, claiming that “the effective date for 
all of his foot conditions should be the day after his discharge, and in 
any event no later than July 22, 1992, the date of the actual filing of 
his original claim.”313  The Board affirmed the effective dates set by 
                                                 
 303. See id. at 926–28 (Newman, J., concurring) (arguing that equitable tolling is 
available under § 5110(b)(1) under certain circumstances). 
 304. Id. at 923 (majority opinion). 
 305. Id. 
 306. Id. 
 307. Id.  38 C.F.R. § 3.400(b)(2)(i), the regulation that implements 38 U.S.C. 
§ 5110(b)(1), provides that, if the VA receives a claim within one year of “separation 
from service,” the effective date will be that day following separation or the date the 
claim arose, whichever is later.  38 C.F.R. § 3.400(b)(2)(i) (2010).  The regulation 
defines “separation from service” as “separation under conditions other than 
dishonorable.”  Id. 
 308. Butler, 603 F.3d at 923. 
 309. Id. at 924. 
 310. Id.  Hallux valgus is a condition in which the big toe deviates inward toward 
the baby toe.  See Foot and Ankle Conditions:  Hallux Valgus (Bunion Deformity), THE 
INSTITUTE FOR FOOT & ANKLE RECONSTRUCTION AT MERCY, 
http://www.mdmercy.com/footandankle/conditions/bigtoe/hallux_valgus.html 
(last visited Feb. 22, 2011) (describing the condition and treatment options). 
 311. Butler, 603 F.3d at 924. 
 312. Id. 
 313. Id. 
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the VA, noting that Butler had not raised the issue of hallux valgus 
until he filed his claim on February 26, 2001, and that he had never 
specifically claimed the left-foot calluses.314  As for Butler’s argument 
that he had been misled into not filing his claim within one year of 
discharge, the Board noted that the record did not reveal any 
communication from Butler showing an intent to file his 1992 claim 
earlier.315 
The Veterans Court affirmed, noting that, even if VA personnel 
had misled Butler into delaying filing, the one-year deadline of § 
5110(b)(1) could not be equitably tolled.316  The court cited the 
Federal Circuit’s decision in Andrews v. Principi,317 which held that the 
one-year period was not tolled by VA’s unlawful failure to notify a 
veteran, at the time of discharge, of the benefits to which he was 
entitled.318 
In a per curiam opinion, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Veterans 
Court’s decision in Butler.319  The court first determined that Butler’s 
equitable tolling argument implicated the VA’s unreviewable fact-
finding.320  The court reasoned as follows:  the only foot conditions at 
issue in the Federal Circuit appeal were the 2001 and 2003 claims for 
hallux valgus and left-foot calluses, respectively.321  The VA had found, 
as a factual matter, that neither of these conditions were included in 
the July 22, 1992 claim for “foot condition.”322  So, even if the July 22, 
1992 claim “were treated as if it had been filed within one year of 
[Butler’s] discharge, . . . this would not change the effective dates for 
any of the foot conditions at issue [on] appeal.”323  Thus, to grant 
Butler relief would require overturning the VA’s factual 
determination that the claims on appeal were not included in the 
1992 claim, an action the Federal Circuit is powerless to take.324 
The court also noted an alternative ground for its holding, stating 
that the ruling of the Veterans Court was supported by the Federal 
                                                 
 314. Id. 
 315. Id. at 924–25. 
 316. Id. at 925. 
 317. 351 F.3d 1134 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 318. Id. at 1136. 
 319. Butler, 603 F.3d at 923. 
 320. Id. at 926. 
 321. Id. 
 322. Id. 
 323. Id. 
 324. Id.; see 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2) (2006) (providing that the Federal Circuit may 
not review factual determinations). 
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Circuit’s holding in Andrews “that equitable tolling is not available 
under 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(1).”325 
In a concurring opinion, Judge Newman disagreed with this 
alternative holding.  She noted that Andrews involved the VA’s failure 
to notify a veteran of available benefits, whereas Butler involved 
affirmative, erroneous advice allegedly given to the veteran.326  Judge 
Newman argued that “[t]he giving of actual misinformation in 
response to specific inquiry has been held to warrant equitable 
tolling, depending on the circumstances.”327  Judge Newman also 
pointed out that the one-year period in § 5110(b)(1) is not a 
“jurisdictional” time limit for which equitable tolling is forbidden.328  
She emphasized that the statute does not limit the time within which 
a veteran can bring a claim for service connection; it affects only the 
effective date if the VA finds service connection.329  Therefore, § 
5110(b)(1) is, in Judge Newman’s view, a “nonjurisdictional claim-
processing rule” that may be tolled when affirmative misinformation 
is given to a veteran.330 
Butler, like the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Henderson,331 
implicates a broader discussion about the equitable leeway that 
should be afforded persons pursuing redress in court or before an 
administrative agency.  Based on the text of the statute, and under 
the reasoning employed by the Court in Henderson, it seems that 
Judge Newman has the better view of whether the one-year deadline 
of § 5110(b)(1) is subject to equitable tolling.  As she correctly noted, 
the statute does not withdraw all power from the VA to award benefits 
if the claim is not filed within one year of discharge.332  It simply 
mandates that the effective date be later than it would have been if 
the veteran had filed the claim earlier.  Because the statute does not 
limit the VA’s authority to hear a claim, the one-year deadline seems 
to be non-jurisdictional. 
Before the Supreme Court decided Henderson, there might have 
been an argument that, under Bowles v. Russell, the time limit in § 
5110(b)(1) is jurisdictional simply because it is found in a federal 
                                                 
 325. Butler, 603 F.3d at 926 (citing Andrews v. Principi, 351 F.3d 1134 (Fed. Cir. 
2003)). 
 326. Id. at 926 (Newman, J., concurring). 
 327. Id. at 927 (citing Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990)). 
 328. Id.  
 329. Id.  
 330. Id. 
 331. See supra Part II.B (discussing Henderson). 
 332. Butler, 603 F.3d at 927 (Newman, J., concurring). 
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statute.333  But, in Henderson, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected 
the argument that all statutory filing deadlines are jurisdictional, 
emphasizing that the deadline in Bowles was for an appeal from one 
court to another—a situation where filing deadlines had long been 
recognized as jurisdictional.334  Section 5110(b)(1), unlike the statute 
in Bowles, does not provide a court-to-court appeal deadline.  And, as 
noted, it does not appear on its face to limit the VA’s authority.  It 
thus seems to be a claims-processing rule that is subject to tolling, just 
as Judge Newman argued.  In all events, this is a question that, as 
Judge Newman noted, warranted further analysis than the court’s 
opinion gave it. 
2. Awards of increased compensation 
As a general rule, if the VA increases a veteran’s disability 
compensation, the increased award is effective the date the veteran 
applied for increased benefits.335  Under 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(2), 
however, an increased compensation award is effective on the date 
the increased disability became ascertainable, if the veteran applied 
for an increase in benefits within one year of that date.336  In Gaston v. 
Shinseki,337 the Federal Circuit made clear that the application for 
increased benefits must be filed within one year of the increase in 
disability for a veteran to be eligible for the earlier effective date.338 
Chester Gaston had been receiving benefits for PTSD and other 
disabilities for nearly a decade when, in March 1999, he filed a claim 
for total disability based on individual unemployability339 and an 
increased rating for PTSD.340  Social Security records showed that 
Gaston’s condition had worsened in 1994, but the VA granted Gaston 
increased ratings with an effective date of March 1999—the date on 
                                                 
 333. Accord Henderson v. Shinseki, 589 F.3d 1201, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc) 
(citing Bowles v. Russell, 511 U.S. 205, 211 (2007)) (“The time limit [for appealing 
to the Veterans Court] is set out statutorily, a crucial point for the Supreme Court in 
determining which of such limits are jurisdictional and which are not.”), rev’d, 131 S. 
Ct. 1197 (2011); see Bowles, 551 U.S. at 210 (noting “the jurisdictional significance of 
the fact that a time limitation is set forth in a statute”).  
 334. Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1202–03. 
 335. 38 U.S.C. § 5110(a) (2006). 
 336. Id. § 5110(b)(2).   
 337. 605 F.3d 979 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 338. Id. at 984. 
 339. See supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text (discussing the criteria for 
establishing a claim of total disability based on individual unemployability). 
 340. Gaston, 605 F.3d at 980. 
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which he filed the claim for an increase.341  Gaston appealed the 
effective date, but the Federal Circuit affirmed.342 
The court noted that § 5110(b)(2) is an exception to the general 
rule that increases in rating are made effective on the date the 
veteran files the claim.343  Specifically, that section states:  “The 
effective date of an award of increased compensation shall be the 
earliest date as of which it is ascertainable that an increase in 
disability had occurred, if application is received within one year 
from such date.”344  Gaston argued that “the Veterans Court 
misconstrued 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(2) by limiting it to cases in 
which . . . an increase in . . . disability occurred during the one year 
prior to the claim.”345  Under Gaston’s proffered interpretation, “if 
there is evidence that an increase occurred during or before the one 
year prior to the veteran’s claim, the effective date for increased 
compensation” could be as much as one year from the date the 
veteran filed the claim.346  Gaston pointed out that his Social Security 
records showed that his condition had worsened in 1994.347  Because 
his disability had increased before he filed his claim, Gaston claimed 
that he was entitled to an effective date of March 25, 1998—one year 
from the date he filed his claim.348 
Gaston’s argument is untenable based on the language of the 
statute, and the Federal Circuit rejected it for three main reasons.  
First, the court pointed out that the statute specifies that the effective 
date shall be the date an increase in disability occurred only if the VA 
receives the application “within one year [of that] date.”349  Second, 
the Federal Circuit noted that eleven other subsections in § 5110 
provide for earlier effective dates for claims filed within one year of 
an event and that it was “equally difficult to read these other 
provisions as allowing earlier effective dates for claims filed more 
than one year after the specified event.”350  Finally, the court discussed 
the legislative history of § 5110(b)(2) and noted that the purpose of 
the section “was to provide veterans a one-year grace period for filing 
a claim following an increase in a service-connected disability.”351  
                                                 
 341. Id. at 980–81. 
 342. Id. at 980. 
 343. Id. at 982 (citing 38 U.S.C. § 5110(a) (2006)). 
 344. 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(2). 
 345. Gaston, 605 F.3d at 982. 
 346. Id. 
 347. Id. at 981. 
 348. Id. at 981–82. 
 349. Id. at 983 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(2) (2006)). 
 350. Gaston, 605 F.3d at 983 & n.2. 
 351. Id. 
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Accordingly, the court concluded:  “[T]he only reasonable 
construction of 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(2) is that a veteran’s claim for 
increased disability compensation must be filed within one year of an 
increase in the disability, as shown by the evidence, in order to obtain 
an effective date earlier than the date of the claim.”352 
3. Reduction of benefits   
While precedential Federal Circuit veterans cases frequently deal 
with efforts by veterans to increase their disability benefits, sometimes 
the VA reduces the benefits paid to a veteran.  For example, until it 
was amended in 2006, 38 U.S.C. § 5313 reduced the benefits of 
veterans who were convicted of felonies and “incarcerated in a 
Federal, State or local penal institution.”353  In Wanless v. Shinseki,354 
the Federal Circuit held that, under this prior version of § 5313, a 
veteran’s benefits may be reduced even if the veteran is incarcerated 
in a privately operated prison.355 
William Wanless had been collecting disability compensation for 
various injuries suffered during his service in the Army.356  In 1993, an 
Oklahoma jury convicted him of first-degree murder, a felony.357  The 
court sentenced Wanless to life in prison without parole, and the VA 
reduced his monthly compensation under § 5313.358  In 1998, Wanless 
was transferred to a prison owned and operated by Corrections 
Corporation of America, a for-profit company that operates prisons 
under contract with the Oklahoma Department of Corrections.359  
Wanless sought to have his benefits reinstated, arguing that he was no 
longer “incarcerated in a Federal, State, or local penal institution.”360  
The Board and the Veterans Court rejected Wanless’s claim, and the 
Federal Circuit affirmed.361 
The court offered four reasons for interpreting former § 5313 to 
include privately operated prisons.  First, the court pointed out that 
the statute’s language “focuses on a veteran’s incarceration . . . in any 
facility and does not distinguish between government-operated 
prisons and privately operated prisons.”362  Second, the court looked 
                                                 
 352. Id. at 984. 
 353. 38 U.S.C. § 5313(a) (2000). 
 354. 618 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 355. Id. at 1334. 
 356. Id.  
 357. Id. 
 358. Id. 
 359. Id. at 1334–35. 
 360. Id. at 1335; 38 U.S.C. § 5313(a) (2000). 
 361. Wanless, 618 F.3d at 1334. 
 362. Id. at 1337. 
2011] 2010 VETERANS BENEFITS LAW DECISIONS 1245 
 
to the legislative history of the statute, which, in the court’s view, 
clearly expressed a purpose to correct the problem of providing tax-
free benefits to criminals who are maintained in prison at the 
expense of taxpayers.363  Third, the court relied on a 2006 “clarifying” 
amendment to the statue, which broadened the category of facilities 
covered by § 5313 to include “Federal, State, local, or other penal 
institution[s] or correctional facilit[ies].”364  Finally, the court deferred 
under Skidmore v. Swift & Co.365 to an opinion of the VA’s General 
Counsel, which had concluded that § 5313 should cover privately 
operated prisons.366 
D. Procedural Matters 
As the cases discussed in this Article have suggested, veterans cases 
often have a tortured procedural history, working their way through 
various administrative bodies and courts.  It is therefore not 
surprising that some of the Federal Circuit’s most significant veterans 
decisions in 2010 addressed matters of procedure.  Of import in 2010 
were rules permitting a veteran to challenge a previously final 
benefits decision on the ground that it contained clear and 
unmistakable error and rules providing that the VA can implicitly 
decide pending claims that are not specifically mentioned in a VA 
decision. 
1. Clear and unmistakable error 
In stark contrast to the principles of res judicata that govern 
litigation in court, a veteran may, at any time, seek revision of a final 
decision by a VA regional office or by the Board.  To have the 
decision revised, the veteran must show that it contained “clear and 
unmistakable error,” referred to as “CUE” in the jargon of veterans 
law.367  For example, a veteran might challenge in a CUE proceeding 
a prior RO ruling as to the effective date of the veteran’s award.  This 
CUE proceeding would begin before the RO.  Once the RO decides 
the CUE claim, the veteran could appeal to the Board.  On this 
                                                 
 363. Id. at 1337–38. 
 364. Id. at 1338 (emphasis altered); 38 U.S.C. § 5313(a) (2006). 
 365. 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (holding that an informal agency judgment is 
entitled to judicial deference depending on “the thoroughness evident in its 
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later 
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking 
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 366. Wanless, 618 F.3d at 1338. 
 367. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 5109A(a), 7111(a) (VA decisions and Board decisions, 
respectively). 
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appeal, the veteran may not challenge as containing CUE, say, an 
earlier RO ruling as to the veteran’s disability rating.  Rather, the 
appeal will be limited to the effective-date CUE claim.  To have the 
disability rating reviewed for CUE, the veteran must file a new CUE 
claim with the RO.  This rule is similar to the waiver rule of appellate 
procedure in civil and criminal litigation:  a party may not raise an 
argument on appeal that the party did not raise in the court or 
agency below.368 
In Guillory v. Shinseki,369 the Federal Circuit confronted a complex 
fact pattern that presented an issue of whether a veteran was 
attempting to raise a new claim of CUE on appeal.370  The court 
determined that the veteran had preserved his CUE claim 
throughout the protracted proceedings, and reversed a ruling by the 
Veterans Court.371 
As noted, the VA rates disabilities on a scale of 0% to 100%, and 
payments increase with increases in disability rating.372  
Extraordinarily disabled veterans who already have a 100% disability 
rating may be eligible for an additional award of “special monthly 
compensation,” often called “SMC” for short.373  SMC awards vary 
based on the severity of the veteran’s disability.374  Moreover, when a 
veteran needs “regular aid and attendance,” the veteran may be 
eligible for additional SMC.375 
The veteran in Guillory, John Guillory, served in the Army during 
the Vietnam War, where he suffered multiple injuries from a gunshot 
wound.376  In 1967, the VA granted Guillory a 100% disability rating 
for brain trauma and awarded SMC.377  In 1992, the VA granted 
service connection and a 100% disability rating for a seizure 
disorder.378  This additional disability qualified Guillory for additional 
SMC as well as for aid and attendance compensation, effective May 
1991 (the date of the seizure diagnosis).379 
                                                 
 368. GREGORY A. CASTANIAS & ROBERT H. KLONOFF, FEDERAL APPELLATE PRACTICE 
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 370. Id. at 984–85. 
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 372. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1155; supra Part I. 
 373. Guillory, 603 F.3d at 983 (citing 38 U.S.C. § 1114(k)–(s)). 
 374. Id. (citing 38 U.S.C. § 1114(l)–(o)).   
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In 1997, Guillory requested review of his file for CUE, claiming that 
he was entitled to aid and assistance from the time of his original 
rating in 1967.380  Among other things, Guillory alleged that the VA 
erred (1) by failing to compensate him for lost use of his hips, thighs, 
and buttocks and (2) by failing to recognize that he suffered from a 
seizure disorder prior to 1991.381  In a 2003 decision, the Board 
rejected these arguments.382  The Veterans Court remanded, however, 
noting that the Board did not discuss a medical record from 1975 
that appeared to diagnose Guillory with a seizure disorder.383 
On remand, the Board concluded that “there was no evidence that 
Guillory’s seizure disorder was severe enough to warrant a 100% 
disability rating prior to 1991.”384  The Veterans Court affirmed the 
Board’s decision that no CUE occurred.385  The Veterans Court also 
noted that, because the remanded 2003 Board decision did not 
discuss Guillory’s hips/thighs/buttocks claim, the Board did not err 
by ignoring that claim on remand.386  Moreover, because the Board 
did not discuss that claim, the Veterans Court ruled that it did not 
have jurisdiction to address it.387 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit dismissed Guillory’s argument that 
the VA committed CUE with regard to the seizure disorder.388  These 
determinations, the Federal Circuit concluded, were based on 
unreviewable questions of fact.389 
The Federal Circuit, however, reversed the Veterans Court’s 
jurisdictional determination.390  The government had asserted that 
Guillory’s hips/thighs/buttocks CUE claim was a new argument that 
Guillory must bring through a new proceeding.391  The court noted, 
however, that Guillory had always made two separate arguments for 
special monthly compensation, one that related to his seizure 
disorder and another that related to his lower body.392  Thus, the 
court concluded, “this is not a case where the veteran raised for the 
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 390. Id. at 987. 
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first time on appeal a new claim of CUE, separate and distinct from 
the claims that the Board addressed below.”393 
2. Implicit denial rule 
A claim for benefits remains pending until it is finally adjudicated 
by the VA.394  If the VA leaves a claim pending, the claim may be 
addressed when the agency adjudicates a subsequent claim.395  
Because the earlier claim remained pending, the effective date for 
any resulting award of benefits will be the effective date applicable to 
the earlier claim.396  Under the “implicit denial rule,” however, a 
subsequent denial of a claim that is identical to a prior, unresolved 
claim terminates the pending status of the prior, unresolved claim.397  
In two cases in 2010, the Federal Circuit clarified the application of 
the implicit denial rule, holding that the adjudication of a formal 
claim for benefits implicitly resolves a pending informal claim for 
benefits398 and that even if a claim remains unresolved by the Board 
on appeal (rather than before the RO), a subsequent appellate 
decision by the Board can implicitly resolve that claim.399 
a. Informal claims 
While veterans may file a formal claim for benefits by submitting 
the appropriate form to the VA,400 the agency considers many other 
actions to be “informal” claims.401  Under 38 C.F.R. § 3.155(a), for 
example, any communication from a veteran that shows an intent to 
apply for benefits is considered an informal claim.402  In addition, 
once the VA has allowed a formal claim for benefits, any medical 
evidence that the VA receives, including an exam conducted at a VA 
facility, is treated as an informal claim for increased benefits.403 
In Munro v. Shinseki,404 the veteran, Philip Munro, suffered from a 
service-connected granuloma (inflammation) on his left lung and 
non-service-connected obstructive pulmonary disease.405  After the VA 
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 394. Adams v. Shinseki, 568 F.3d 956, 960 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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awarded him benefits for the granuloma, Munro underwent 
pulmonary tests at a VA medical center in 1995 and 1997.406  These 
tests showed that Munro suffered from severe obstructive airways 
disease, severe obstructive pulmonary disease, and was permanently 
disabled.407  In September 1997, Munro formally sought an increased 
disability rating, but the VA denied it because the diagnoses were 
unrelated to Munro’s service-connected granuloma.408  In 2003, 
Munro filed another formal claim for total disability based on 
individual unemployability (TDIU), which the VA granted effective 
March 31, 2003, the date of his formal claim.409 
On appeal, Munro sought an earlier effective date, arguing that the 
informal claims initiated by his 1995 and 1997 VA medical 
examinations were still pending when the VA granted him TDIU in 
2003.410  Munro argued that the effective date of the TDIU claim 
should be 1995, or 1997 at the latest.411 
The Federal Circuit rejected this argument under the implicit 
denial rule.  The court noted that “the implicit denial rule is, at 
bottom, a notice provision.”412  The standard is “whether [a VA 
decision] provided sufficient information for a reasonable claimant 
to know that he would not be awarded benefits for his asserted 
disability.”413 
Thus, a VA decision need not expressly discuss a pending claim for 
that claim to be deemed denied.  In Munro’s case, the informal 
claims and the formal claim were identical—for an increased rating 
due to his lone service-connected disability, granuloma of the left 
lung.414  Accordingly, the decision denying Munro’s September 1997 
formal claim also implicitly denied the pending informal claims.415 
Practical concerns largely justify this application of the implicit 
denial rule.  Veterans receiving medical benefits regularly visit VA 
hospitals, creating scores of informal claims.416  From an 
administrative perspective, it would be burdensome and inefficient to 
require the VA to explicitly discuss every single informal claim in its 
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decisions.417  Moreover, the consequence of the VA’s failure to discuss 
any one informal claim would be an unwarranted windfall.  The 
veteran would be granted an effective date that is the date of the 
unaddressed informal claim, even though the VA will have likely 
denied a subsequent formal claim that relates to that same disability.  
Munro, for example, had only one service-connected disability, the 
left-lung granuloma.418  His 1995 and 1997 informal claims related to 
that disability.419  In 1997, the VA explicitly rejected a formal claim for 
an increased rating of that disability.420  Although the VA increased 
Munro’s disability rating in 2003, it would be an unwarranted windfall 
to the veteran to make that increase retroactive to the date of the 
informal claims in 1997 (or 1995), just because the 1997 VA 
decision—which related to the same disability as the informal 
claims—did not discuss Munro’s 1995 and 1997 visits to the VA 
medical center. 
b. Unresolved appeals 
While claims, both formal and informal, remain pending before 
the RO until they are definitively adjudicated, claims also remain 
pending on appeal until adjudicated by the Board.  In another 
notable decision this year, the Federal Circuit held, in Jones v. 
Shinseki,421 that a claim that is pending in appellate status cannot be 
resolved by a subsequent RO adjudication.  Only a subsequent Board 
decision can resolve the veteran’s claim.422 
In September 1973, Clabon Jones filed a claim for “nerves,” which 
he claimed was a service-connected illness.423  The RO denied the 
claim.424  Jones filed a notice of disagreement, but the RO never 
issued a statement of the case, as it is required by statute to do.425  
Accordingly, Jones’s claim remained pending in “appellate” status.426  
In 1985, Jones requested that his claim be reopened and that he be 
granted service connection for PTSD.427  The RO denied the request 
and, on appeal, the Board denied service connection for a nervous 
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condition, including PTSD.428  In 1991, however, the VA granted 
Jones service connection for PTSD with an effective date of May 1989, 
the date Jones had filed another request to reopen.429 
Jones appealed the effective date, claiming that the denial of his 
1973 claim was not final because the RO never provided a statement 
of the case.430  The Board rejected Jones’s appeal, stating that the 
Board’s 1986 decision denying service connection for PTSD implicitly 
resolved the 1973 claim.431  Both the Veterans Court and the Federal 
Circuit affirmed.432 
The Federal Circuit agreed with Jones that, because the 1973 claim 
remained pending on appeal, it could not be resolved by a 
subsequent RO decision.433  It could only be resolved by a subsequent 
Board decision.434  The 1986 Board decision rejected a PTSD claim 
that was, in the view of the Veterans Court, identical to the 1973 
claim for “nerves.”435  The Federal Circuit held that this factual 
determination was outside the scope of its review.436 
The court thus applied the notice standard to determine whether 
the implicit denial rule was satisfied: 
The key question is whether sufficient notice has been provided so 
that a veteran would know, or reasonably can be expected to 
understand, that he will not be awarded benefits for the disability 
asserted in his pending claim, and thus can decide for himself 
whether to accept the decision or seek redress elsewhere.437 
In the court’s view, the fact that the Board had denied a claim 
identical to the 1973 claim provided Jones with sufficient notice that 
the 1973 claim for “nerves” had been denied.438 
E. Claims Arising from VA Medical Treatment 
In addition to providing benefits for injuries related to military 
service, the veterans statute provides benefits for injuries arising from 
VA medical treatment.  Specifically, 38 U.S.C. § 1151(a)(1)(A) 
entitles a veteran (or the veteran’s dependents) to benefits if the 
cause of the veteran’s disability or death was “carelessness, 
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negligence, lack of proper skill, error in judgment, or similar instance 
of fault on the part of the [VA] in furnishing” medical treatment.439  
Congress enacted § 1151(a)(1)(A) in response to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Brown v. Gardner,440 which held that the prior 
version of the statute did not require a claimant to show fault by the 
VA.441 
The claim in Gardner arose out of errors that occurred during 
surgery for a herniated disc at a VA hospital.442  In Roberson v. 
Shinseki,443 the widow of a veteran sought benefits under the same, 
prior version of § 1151, claiming that the VA’s failure to diagnose her 
husband’s cancer entitled her to benefits.444  Before the VA, Mrs. 
Roberson and the VA presented conflicting evidence about whether 
the VA physicians should have discovered Mr. Roberson’s cancer 
during his final visit to a VA facility.445  (Physicians discovered the 
cancer during Mr. Roberson’s subsequent treatment at a private 
facility.)  The Board rejected Mrs. Roberson’s evidence and the 
Veterans Court affirmed, noting that Mrs. Roberson had not shown 
that the VA “should have diagnosed” her husband’s cancer prior to 
the actual diagnosis in the private facility.446 
On appeal, Mrs. Roberson argued that the Veterans Court’s 
conclusion conflicted with Gardner because it introduced an element 
of fault into the analysis:  whether the physicians should have diagnosed 
her husband’s cancer.447  The Federal Circuit rejected this argument 
and affirmed the Veterans Court.448  The Federal Circuit pointed to a 
key distinction between Gardner and the case at hand:  Gardner 
involved an act of commission, botched surgery, while Roberson 
involved an act of omission, the failure to diagnose the veteran’s 
cancer.449  In a case involving an act of commission, like Gardner, it is 
possible for a claimant to meet the burden as to causation (by 
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showing that VA treatment caused an injury), but not negligence (by 
not showing that the VA physician failed to act with ordinary care).450 
By contrast, in an omission case like Roberson, the court suggested 
that “the only way to show causation is to demonstrate that the VA 
failed to diagnose when it should have.”451  In other words, in a 
failure-to-diagnose case, a fault standard (whether the VA should have 
diagnosed the disease) is the only way to ensure the requirement of a 
causal connection between the treatment and the injury is met.452  As 
the Federal Circuit explained, “[w]ithout a showing that the VA 
should have diagnosed a condition, the VA would be subject to 
insuring for every possible condition that a veteran has, even if 
unrelated to . . . VA treatment.”453 
Based solely on the plain language of the prior version of § 1151, 
the Federal Circuit’s conclusion is at least debatable.  The question 
under the statute is simply whether the injury occurred “as the result 
of” the VA’s failure to act.454  Even if the VA physicians maintained a 
high level of care, injuries could still “result” from the physicians’ 
failure to take certain actions.  For example, it might be customary in 
the medical community to provide only an x-ray to investigate certain 
symptoms.  But a particular veteran might be suffering from an injury 
detectable only by an MRI.  If this injury becomes more severe, it 
might be said that the increased severity is a “result” of the VA not 
conducting the MRI to detect the injury, even if no physician of 
ordinary skill and judgment would have ordered the MRI. 
As the Federal Circuit noted, however, this reading of the statute 
would make the VA the insurer of practically any injury that a veteran 
developed while in VA care, even if a reasonable physician would not 
have diagnosed the injury.455  Plainly, Congress did not intend for the 
VA to be responsible for any injury a veteran might incur.456  Yet, as 
we have seen in other cases, the Federal Circuit would not have been 
required to interpret around the language of the statute had 
Congress drafted it more carefully.  In any event, the issues raised in 
Roberson should not arise under the new version of § 1151, which 
explicitly requires the claimant to show that the VA was at fault.457 
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Like many of the cases discussed in this part, Roberson is emblematic 
of the difficult balance the Federal Circuit tries to strike in nearly 
every veterans case—reconciling the rights of injured or disabled 
veterans (or their survivors) with the reality of an overworked, 
underfunded, bureaucratic agency.  While, as discussed in the next 
Part, veterans law is occasionally altered by congressional legislation 
or regulations issued by the VA, the bulk of veterans law is made in 
the case-by-case adjudication of individual benefits claims.  The 
Federal Circuit has, and will continue to have, an important role in 
ensuring that the benefits system strikes a fair balance between 
deserving veterans and the preservation of scarce VA resources. 
IV. VETERANS LAW IN THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES 
Although this Article has mainly focused on legal developments in 
the judicial branch, the corpus of veterans law is a product of all 
three branches of the federal government.  This part provides a brief 
overview of the year’s significant developments in the executive and 
legislative branches. 
A. Executive Branch 
In 2010, the VA made three major regulatory changes.  First, as 
discussed above in connection with the Paralyzed Veterans case,458 the 
VA—at the insistence of the Federal Circuit—expanded the list of 
health problems that the VA will presume to be connected to in-
service exposure to Agent Orange or other herbicides used during 
the Vietnam War.459  Under the new regulation, the following diseases 
will be presumed to be service connected for veterans who served in 
Vietnam between January 1962 and May 1975:  hairy-cell leukemia, 
other chronic B-cell leukemias, Parkinson’s disease, and ischemic 
heart disease.460  The VA has stated that it expects more than 150,000 
new claims to be filed within twelve to eighteen months of adoption 
of the new regulation.461  It also has planned to review approximately 
90,000 previously denied claims by Vietnam veterans for possible 
service connection under the new regulation.462  Veterans who have 
                                                 
 458. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 459. Diseases Associated with Exposure to Certain Herbicide Agents, 75 Fed. Reg. 
53,202 (Aug. 31, 2010) (to be codified at 38 C.F.R. pt. 3). 
 460. Id. at 53,216; see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(6) (2010) (setting forth 
presumption of service connection for certain diseases for certain Vietnam veterans). 
 461. VA Publishes Final Regulation to Aid Veterans Exposed to Agent Orange, U.S. DEP’T 
OF VETERANS AFFAIRS (Aug. 30, 2010), 
 http://www.va.gov/opa/pressrel/pressrelease.cfm?id=1945. 
 462. Id. 
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previously filed claims based on Agent Orange exposure could be 
eligible for retroactive payments based on those claims.463  In the first 
six weeks after the amended regulation became effective, the VA 
reviewed more than 28,000 claims related to Agent Orange 
exposure.464 
Second, the VA established new presumptions of service 
connection for nine infectious diseases associated with service in 
Southwest Asia (including Iraq) and Afghanistan.465  Under the 
amended regulation, the VA will presume diseases such as malaria, 
the West Nile virus, and tuberculosis, among others, to be service 
connected466 for veterans who served in the Persian Gulf at any time 
after August 2, 1990467 and in Afghanistan at any time after September 
19, 2001.468 
Finally, in a move that attracted significant attention from the 
popular media, the VA relaxed the requirements for certain veterans 
seeking benefits for PTSD.469  Specifically, the amended regulation no 
longer requires corroborating evidence that the in-service stressor 
claimed by the veteran actually occurred if the claimed stressor is 
related to fear of hostile military or terrorist activity, a VA physician 
confirms that the stressor supports a diagnosis of PTSD, and the 
stressor is consistent with the circumstances of the veteran’s service.470  
The amended regulation should relieve veterans from proving that a 
specific traumatic event (such as a bombing or firefight) occurred, so 
long as the veteran served in a war zone and in a role consistent with 
the event that allegedly caused the condition.471 
B. Legislative Branch 
Congress also made important changes to the law of veterans 
benefits this year.  First, the high-profile economic stimulus bill, the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, gave well over $1 billion to 
                                                 
 463. Id. 
 464. VA Processes First Claims for New Agent Orange Presumptives, U.S. DEP’T OF 
VETERANS AFFAIRS (Dec. 17, 2010), 
 http://www.va.gov/opa/pressrel/pressrelease.cfm?id=2022. 
 465. Presumptions of Service Connection for Persian Gulf Service, 75 Fed. Reg. 
59,968, 59,971 (Sept. 29, 2010) (to be codified at 38 C.F.R. pt. 3). 
 466.    Id. 
 467. 38 C.F.R. § 3.2(i) (2010). 
 468. Presumptions of Service Connection for Persian Gulf Service, 75 Fed. Reg. at 
59,971. 
 469. See, e.g., James Dao, V.A. Is Easing Rules to Cover Stress Disorder, N.Y. TIMES, July 
8, 2010, at A1 (discussing the new PTSD regulation). 
 470. Stressor Determinations for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 75 Fed. Reg. 
39,843 (July 13, 2010) (to be codified at 38 C.F.R. pt. 3). 
 471. Dao, supra note 469, at A1. 
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the VA.472  The VA allocated much of this funding to improving 
energy efficiency in VA facilities and also embarked on many projects 
to improve VA medical facilities and cemeteries.473 
Congress also expanded veterans’ eligibility for reimbursement by 
the VA for emergency medical treatment in a non-VA facility.474  The 
House report accompanying this bill stated that, while the VA is 
required to reimburse a veteran for emergency treatment in non-VA 
facilities,475 the VA under then-current law was not paying for 
emergency treatment in non-VA facilities if the veteran had third-
party insurance that paid any portion of the treatment costs.476  For 
example, if a veteran had an automobile insurance policy with 
minimal health insurance coverage, the VA would not reimburse the 
veteran for the remaining expenses of emergency care.477  The new 
law allows the VA to reimburse a veteran for treatment in a non-VA 
facility, even if the veteran has insurance that would pay a portion of 
the emergency care.478 
In addition, Congress passed the Veterans’ Benefits Act of 2010.479  
Among other things, the law extends and enhances the life insurance 
available to veterans,480 increases the VA-provided burial and funeral 
expenses for certain veterans,481 and increases the benefits for 
veterans with lost limbs, veterans with traumatic brain injuries, and 
the surviving spouses of veterans with dependent children under age 
eighteen.482 
Finally, Congress approved the annual cost-of-living adjustment for 
veterans benefits.483  But because the consumer price index did not 
increase in 2010, benefits payments will not increase.484 
                                                 
 472. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 
Stat. 115, 199. 
 473. VA Tops $1B Mark in Recovery Act Distributions, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS 
(Oct. 15, 2010), http://www.va.gov/opa/pressrel/pressrelease.cfm?id=1982. 
 474. Act of Feb. 1, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-137, 123 Stat. 3495. 
 475. 38 U.S.C. § 1725 (2006). 
 476. H.R. REP. NO. 111-55, at 2 (2009). 
 477. Id. at 2–3. 
 478. Pub. L. No. 111-137, § 1, 123 Stat. at 3495. 
 479. Veterans’ Benefit Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-275, 124 Stat. 2864. 
 480. See id. §§ 402, 407, 124 Stat. at 2879–81 (including an extension of the 
duration of group life insurance for totally disabled veterans and an opportunity for 
certain veterans to increase the amount of life insurance). 
 481. Id. § 501, 124 Stat. at 2881. 
 482. Id. §§ 601–02, 124 Stat. at 2885–88. 
 483. Veterans’ Compensation Cost-of-Living Adjustment Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-247, § 2, 124 Stat. 2623, 2623; see also H.R. REP. NO. 111-452, at 2 (2010) (noting 
that Congress has passed cost-of-living adjustments for veterans every year since 
1976). 
 484. Under the Law No Social Security COLA for 2011, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., (Oct. 15, 
2010), http://www.ssa.gov/pressoffice/pr/2011cola-pr.htm; see also Cost-of-Living 
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CONCLUSION 
It is a busy time in veterans benefits law, both in the usual fora—
the VA, the Veterans Court, the Federal Circuit, and Congress—and 
in a not-so-usual forum—the Supreme Court of the United States.  
Whether or not the Supreme Court will maintain its involvement in 
veterans law is unclear.  As suggested in this Article, however, a 
modest docket of veterans cases in the near future is not out of the 
question. 
One thing that seems certain is that veterans’ demands on the 
benefits system will continue to increase.  Although President Obama 
has declared an end to combat operations in Iraq485 and has stated a 
plan for a limited withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan in 
2011,486 the foundation for future stress on the benefits system has 
already been laid.  Nearly 6,000 soldiers have been killed and another 
42,000 have been wounded in the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts.487  
Many of these soldiers, as well as their spouses and children, will call 
upon the veterans benefits system for the rest of their lives.  And, 
when they are unable to obtain the benefits they seek, some of them 
will turn to the courts.  These cases will continue to present the 
Federal Circuit, and perhaps the Supreme Court, with challenging 
questions of veterans law for decades to come. 
  
                                                 
Adjustment Act § 2(c), 124 Stat. at 2623 (tying increase in veterans benefits to Social 
Security cost-of-living adjustment). 
 485. See Helene Cooper & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Declares an End to Iraq 
Combat Mission, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2010, at A1 (noting that 49,700 American troops 
remain in Iraq and that the same number of troops will remain through at least 
summer 2011). 
 486. Helene Cooper & David E. Sanger, U.S. Will Widen War on Militants Inside 
Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2010, at A1. 
 487. DOD Casualty Reports, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., 
 http://www.defense.gov/news/casualty.pdf (last updated Mar. 3, 2011). 
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ADDENDUM 
As in other annual surveys of the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence,488 
I provide a statistical addendum summarizing the year’s decisions.  
This addendum provides an empirical snapshot of the Federal 
Circuit’s veterans opinions, both in 2010 and over the past decade.  
While further data gathering and analysis is certainly possible, this 
addendum provides a brief, objective overview of the Federal 
Circuit’s approach to deciding veterans cases. 
Table 1:  Results of Precedential Veterans Opinions, January 1, 2010 to 
December 31, 2010 
Result Number of Cases 
Affirmed 11 
Dismissed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded 
1 
Vacated and remanded 2 
Total 14 
 
To illustrate the extent of the Federal Circuit’s agreement (or 
disagreement) with the decisions of the Veterans Court, Table 1 
summarizes the decretal language of the Federal Circuit’s published 
veterans opinions in 2010.489  Most of the Federal Circuit’s 
precedential veterans opinions (as well as its unpublished 
decisions)490 uphold the Veterans Court’s determination, either by 
affirming on the merits or dismissing for lack of jurisdiction.  In 2010, 
78.6% (11 of 14) of the Federal Circuit’s published veterans opinions 
affirmed the Veterans Court’s determination.  Although this is 
obviously a small sample, this affirmance rate is appreciably higher 
than the 62% affirmance rate for published opinions by regional 
circuit courts of appeals reviewing district court or agency 
                                                 
 488. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Adamo, Gregory A. Castanias, Mark N. Reiter & 
Lawrence D. Rosenberg, Survey of the Federal Circuit’s Patent Law Decisions in 2000:  Y2K 
in Review, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1435, 1699–706 (2001) (2001 patent law survey); 
Castanias et al., supra note 4, at 975–85 (2006 patent law survey); Castanias et al., 
supra note 127, at 1056 (2010 patent law survey).   
 489. Decretal language is the portion of the opinion (usually the final line) that 
states the court’s formal order.  Castanias et al., supra note 4, at 984 n.1565 (citing 
Jon O. Newman, Decretal Language:  Last Words of an Appellate Opinion, 70 BROOK. L. 
REV. 727, 727 (2005)). 
 490. See supra note 129 (noting that most of the Federal Circuit’s 2010 non-
precedential veterans decisions dismissed cases for lack of jurisdiction). 
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determinations.491  Whether the Federal Circuit consistently affirms 
the Veterans Court at a rate higher than the regional circuits affirm 
the district courts and uphold the actions of administrative agencies 
could be an interesting question for future research. 
Table 2:  Precedential Veterans Opinions by Judge, January 1, 2010 to 
December 31, 2010 
Judge 
Number 
Authored 
Number on 
Panel 
Percentage 
Authored 
Number of 
Separate 
Opinions 
Number 
Authored 
Generating 
Separate 
Opinions 
Rader 0 3 0.0% 0 0 
Newman 0 5 0.0% 2 0 
Lourie 0 1 0.0% 0 0 
Michel 0 0 — 0 0 
Bryson 1 7 14.3% 0 0 
Gajarsa 2 3 66.7% 0 0 
Linn 0 1 0.0% 0 0 
Dyk 4 6 66.7% 0 0 
Prost 0 4 0.0% 0 0 
Moore 1 4 25.0% 0 0 
      
Friedman 2 2 100% 0 1 
Archer 0 0 — 0 0 
Mayer 1 3 33.3% 0 0 
Plager 1 1 100% 0 0 
Clevenger 0 1 0.0% 0 0 
Schall 0 0 — 0 0 
      
Per 
Curiam 
1 — — — 1 
Visiting 1 1 100% 0 0 
      
Total 14 42 — 2 2 
 
                                                 
 491. ASHLYN K. KUERSTEN & DONALD R. SONGER, DECISIONS ON THE U.S. COURTS OF 
APPEALS 40 (2001).  Kuersten and Songer’s sample set covers the years 1925 through 
1996.  Id. at 58–61 tbl.2.9. 
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Table 2 provides a snapshot of which judges wrote and participated 
in the Federal Circuit’s precedential veterans decisions in 2010.  The 
first column (“number authored”) indicates the number of 
precedential majority opinions in veterans cases drafted by each 
judge.492  The second column (“number on panel”) indicates for how 
many precedential veterans decisions each judge was on the panel.  
The number in the second column includes decisions for which each 
judge was the opinion author.  Judge Plager, for example, was on the 
panel for one precedential veterans decision in 2010, and he wrote 
the opinion. 
The third column (“percentage authored”) shows the percentage 
of precedential veterans decisions that a judge participated in for 
which the judge authored the majority disposition.  The fourth 
column (“number of separate opinions”) indicates the number of 
separate opinions (concurrences or dissents) authored by each judge 
in veterans cases.  The final column (“number authored generating 
separate opinions”) indicates which judges authored the majority 
opinions that generated those separate opinions. 
Because the Federal Circuit randomly assigns cases and judges to 
panels,493 one would expect that each of the court’s active judges 
would hear a roughly equal number of veterans cases and that each 
judge would participate in and author a roughly equal number of 
precedential decisions.  Yet three of the court’s judges, Judges 
Gajarsa, Dyk, and Friedman, wrote over half of the court’s published 
veterans opinions in 2010. 
Again, this sample of opinions is too small to support any definitive 
conclusions.  The data does, however, replicate trends that other 
commentators have found in Federal Circuit patent cases.  Data 
collected in 2006, for example, showed that Judge Dyk was more 
likely than most of his colleagues to participate in a precedential 
decision, suggesting that he was particularly likely to request that the 
panel publish its disposition.494  In addition, data from that same year 
suggested that Judge Newman was the most likely of her colleagues to 
                                                 
 492. Individual Federal Circuit judges drafted twelve of the fourteen precedential 
veterans opinions in 2010.  One opinion was issued per curiam, Butler v. Shinseki, 
603 F.3d 922, 923 (Fed. Cir. 2010), and Judge David Folsom, Chief Judge of the U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, wrote the panel’s opinion in Roberson 
v. Shinseki, 607 F.3d 809, 810 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 493. FED. CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURE 3(1) (Nov. 14, 2008); see also FED. 
CIR. R. 47.2(b) (providing that each judge should hear cases from a cross-section of 
the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction). 
 494. Castanias et al., supra note 4, at 977.  See generally FED. CIR. INTERNAL 
OPERATING PROCEDURE 10(6) (outlining the procedure for a judge to request that the 
panel issue a precedential opinion).  
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draft a separate opinion in a patent case.495  Likewise, in the court’s 
2010 veterans decisions, Judge Newman was the only judge to issue a 
separate opinion.496 
Although some scholars have empirically studied the behavior of 
the Federal Circuit’s judges in addressing particular substantive 
questions,497 I am not aware of any study that has examined the 
behavior of individual judges across the court’s subject-matter 
jurisdiction.498  This may also be a fruitful avenue for future research.  
Such a project could reveal whether individual judges use consistent 
analytical methods in all types of cases.499 
                                                 
 495. Castanias et al., supra note 4, at 977; see also Christopher A. Cotropia, 
Determining Uniformity Within the Federal Circuit by Measuring Dissent and En Banc Review, 
43 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 801, 820 (2010) (noting that, in 2008 and 2009, Judge 
Newman filed the largest number of dissents among the judges on the court). 
 496. Judge Newman also dissented from the court’s first precedential veterans 
opinion of 2011.  Hargrove v. Shinseki, 629 F.3d 1377, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(Newman, J., dissenting). 
 497. See, e.g., Michael P. Allen, Significant Developments in Veterans Law (2004–2006) 
and What They Reveal About the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims and the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 483, 491–94 (2007) (studying 
the court’s veterans benefits decisions); John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, How 
Federal Circuit Judges Vote in Patent Validity Cases, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 745, 745–46 
(2000) (studying the court’s patent validity decisions); R. Polk Wagner & Lee 
Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding?  An Empirical Assessment of Judicial 
Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105 (2004) (studying the court’s claim construction 
decisions). 
 498. Cf. Cotropia, supra note 495, at 815–17 (collecting data on Federal Circuit 
dissent and en banc practice, some of which was not limited to patent cases). 
 499. Wagner and Petherbridge, for example, identified two judicial approaches to 
patent claim construction:  (1) the proceduralist approach, which uses a hierarchy of 
sources to determine meaning, with the plain language of the claim being 
paramount, and (2) the holistic approach, which looks to varied interpretive clues to 
determine the claim’s meaning in the particular circumstances presented.  Wagner & 
Petherbridge, supra note 497, at 1133–34.  It would be interesting to see if, in 
veterans cases, judges who employ a proceduralist claim construction method prefer 
clear rules, such as the presumption of harmless error rejected by the Supreme 
Court in Sanders, and if judges who employ a holistic approach to claim construction 
emphasize a standards-based approach to benefits claims, emphasizing that the VA 
should take into account all the information before it, an approach used in this 
year’s decisions on the duty to assist and service connection.  See supra Part III.A–B 
(examining the Federal Circuit’s 2010 duty-to-assist and service-connection 
decisions). 
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Figure 1:  Precedential Opinions Reviewing the Court of Appeals for Veterans 
Claims, 2000 to 2010 
 
Figure 1 depicts the number of precedential veterans opinions 
issued by the Federal Circuit each year since 2000.  It makes clear that 
the court issued an unusually low number of precedential veterans 
opinions in 2010 after issuing a relatively high number of veterans 
opinions in the three-year period from 2007 through 2009. 
Figure 2:  Precedential Veterans Opinions Compared to Total Number of 
Decisions Reviewing the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, 2006 to 2010  
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To put the decline of precedential opinions in context, Figure 2 
compares, for the last five years, the number of precedential veterans 
opinions to the total number of veterans cases decided by Federal 
Circuit merits panels.500  Figure 2 shows that, not only did the number 
of precedential veterans opinions decline in 2010, the total number 
of veterans cases decided on the merits declined as well.  Given that, 
over the past ten years, the number of claims received by the VA 
annually has increased 75% (from 579,000 in 2000 to 1,014,000 in 
2009),501 one would not expect the number of Federal Circuit 
veterans opinions to trend downward.  If a downward trend 
continues, this, too, might be an interesting area for future 
investigation, especially if it contrasts with an increased number of 
Supreme Court veterans cases. 
 
                                                 
 500. I obtained the number of adjudications from data compiled by the Federal 
Circuit itself.  See Statistics, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/the-court/statistics.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2011) 
(scroll down to “Caseload, By Category,” then click on the hyperlinks for “Table of 
data to accompany pie charts”).  The annual data collected by the Federal Circuit 
corresponds to the court’s fiscal year (October 1 to September 30), while the data I 
have collected on the number of precedential opinions (from Westlaw) corresponds 
to the calendar year (January 1 to December 31).  While this data does not match 
precisely, it still gives a helpful picture of trends in the Federal Circuit’s veterans 
docket. 
 501. White House Seeks $125 Billion for Veterans in 2011, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS 
AFFAIRS, (Feb. 1, 2010), http://www.va.gov/opa/pressrel/pressrelease.cfm?id=1848. 
